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Despite its iconic status, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins's constitutional
basis is unknown. Indeed, because previous justifications for Erie are
wanting, leading theorists have claimed that Erie has no constitutional
basis at all. This Article challenges that view as profoundly mistaken. While
previous accounts of Erie are indeed inadequate, Erie does have a
constitutional basis: the nondelegation doctrine. Just as Congress cannot
delegate unbridled power to the Executive Branch, Congress also cannot
delegate unbridled power to the Judicial Branch. Building on that
commonsensical premise, which is consistent with the Constitution's text
and structure and which was endorsed by Chief Justice Marshall himself,
this Article argues that Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson because Congress
cannot constitutionally empower federal courts to govern the Nation 's
commercial law without providing an intelligible principle. Understanding
Erie in nondelegation terms also explains the Supreme Court's more recent
holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, which relied on Erie to read the Alien
Tort Statute narrowly. Just as Congress cannot delegate broad authority to
the federal courts to govern the Nation's internal commerce, Congress
cannot delegate broad authority to the federal courts to govern the Nation 's
foreign affairs. Finally, because Erie, properly understood, holds that the
nondelegation doctrine applies to the Judicial Branch, this Article observes
that the Sherman Act may be constitutionally problematic as applied.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this counterfactual. It is 1938. To facilitate interstate trade,
Congress has passed the National Uniformity Act (NUA), which empowers
the President to issue "codes of uniform law" to govern commercial law
disputes so long as a state has not enacted its own statutory law. Though the
NUA instructs the President to create these "general" rules, it contains no
guidance concerning what they should say. A Pennsylvania citizen sues a
New York corporation and wins under these "codes of uniform law." Citing
the recently decided A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States1 and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,2 the corporation appeals to the U.S. Supreme
Court, arguing that Congress cannot delegate to the President that much
authority over the Nation's economy with no intelligible principle. The Court
agrees. After all, the effect of the NUA on the national economy is
comparable to that of the National Industrial Recovery Act (Schechter
1 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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Poultry), 3 and the NUA contains no intelligible principle (Panama
Refining),4 so the NUA must fall too. In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that
"the conventional nondelegation doctrine has had two good years and more
than 210 bad ones." 5 And administrative law rolls on.
Now return to the real world. In 1938, the Supreme Court did make a
constitutional holding similar to the one set out in this counterfactual.
Pursuant to delegated power, a branch of government other than Congress
was exercising unconstrained authority to create vast amounts of law with
profound effects on the national economy. The Supreme Court held that
federal policy must be "governed ... by Acts of Congress," 6 and without
congressional guidance there is no valid federal law. This constitutional
holding sits well with Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining, two cases
decided three years earlier by essentially the same Court. That 1938 case, of
course, was Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 7 But despite being one of the
most discussed cases in American law, Erie is not understood as a
nondelegation opinion in the same vein as Schechter Poultry and Panama
Refining. That should change.
To be sure, Erie is different from Schechter Poultry and Panama
Refining. Those well-known nondelegation cases involved delegations to the
Executive Branch, while Erie addressed a delegation to the Judicial Branch.
But is that distinction decisive? Ask yourself this question: Could "Members
of Congress even if they wished, vote all power to the federal courts and
adjourn sine die"?8 To ask is to answer. At some point the judicial power-
like the executive power-must "run out" because the delegated authority is
just too great for the power exercised to be anything but purely legislative.
Building on that commonsensical premise, the question then is not whether
the nondelegation doctrine can apply to courts, but instead whether Erie was
a case where the judicial power had run out. In light of the broad,
unchanneled power exercised by federal courts under Swift v. Tyson's 9
3 Cf Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 548-50.
4 Cf Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 429-30 (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
5 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 322 (2000)
("[T]he conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).").
6 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
7 Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
8 Cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Our Members of Congress could not, even if they wished, vote all power to the
President and adjourn sine die.").
9 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 10 Erie indeed can and should be
understood as a nondelegation case.
There is deep confusion concerning Erie's constitutional basis, including
whether there even is one at all. While previous accounts of Erie's
constitutional footing are indeed flawed, this Article offers a new
constitutional justification: the nondelegation doctrine. Thus, properly
understood, Erie does not sound in the Commerce Clause, the Equal
Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the
Supremacy Clause, an Article III rejection of all federal common law, or
some meta-concern about legal positivism. Nor was Erie wrongly decided.
Instead, Erie is constitutionally correct for the simple reason that pursuant to
the nondelegation doctrine, Congress cannot hand off power to create law
governing broad swaths of the national economy with no intelligible
principle to guide that law's creation-no matter which branch is Congress's
delegate.
Accordingly, this Article's central claim is that the Rules of Decision Act
as interpreted by Swift was unconstitutional because if federal courts are
given the undirected power to create law in diversity cases in which a state
statute does not resolve the question (as they could under the Swift regime),"I
then that is too much power over too much of the American economy for
Congress to give away. Erie, thus, was right to bring the Swift regime to an
end. Importantly, there are hints in Erie that the Supreme Court intended to
issue a nondelegation decision. 12 But more important still, because the
nondelegation doctrine explains Erie while no other constitutional basis does,
Erie can and should be read in nondelegation terms, even if the
nondelegation doctrine was not expressly on the Erie Court's mind.
The doctrinal advantages that result from characterizing Erie as a
nondelegation case are apparent. First, at a "micro" level, it fits Erie well. It
is no secret that many of the explanations for Erie as a doctrine do not
actually explain Erie as a case. Indeed, some of the justifications given for
Erie are irreconcilable with the facts in Erie and the general context of law
when Erie was decided. Erie, for instance, cannot be an equal protection case
because the Equal Protection Clause was not held to apply to the federal
government until more than a decade after Erie was decided. 13 Nor does Erie
sit comfortably as a Commerce Clause case. Even under a narrow conception
of the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate tort liability for accidents
10 Federal Judiciary Act, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
11 See Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L. REv. 595, 600 (2008).
12 See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
13 Green, supra note 11, at 603 (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500
(1954)).
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involving interstate trains-which was the factual situation in Erie.14 And the
Tenth Amendment is a nonstarter. If the Tenth Amendment is just the inverse
of Congress's enumerated powers, then it falls with the Commerce Clause; if
the Tenth Amendment is a stand-alone argument, then reading Erie as a
Tenth Amendment case does not jibe with precedent. 15 Understanding Erie
as a nondelegation decision avoids these doctrinal problems.
Second, at a "macro" level, characterizing Erie as a nondelegation
decision sidesteps some of the more extreme implications for other doctrines
that have been drawn from Erie-implications that, if followed, would
needlessly upset a great deal of law. On the one hand, for instance, some
suggest that Erie makes all federal common law inherently suspect. 16 If that
were true, a lot of law would have to go. Understanding Erie as a
nondelegation case avoids that problem. Just as most agency action will not
be struck down as unconstitutional even though law is being made in the
"executive" process, most federal common law will not be struck down as
unconstitutional even though law is being made during the "judicial" process.
It is only when the delegation goes so far that the executive or judicial power
runs out that the offending statute cannot stand. This is not an easy line to
draw, but precedent is plain that there is a line. 17 In other words, federal
common law is not categorically unconstitutional, but there are meaningful
limits.
On the other hand, but equally extreme, it has recently been argued that
Erie should have no precedential value whatsoever outside of "federal courts
deciding legal issues commonly heard in state court." 18 Under this theory, the
Supreme Court's cases that have extended Erie to new areas of law should be
uprooted as constitutionally unsound. But this view of Erie is also mistaken.
Because Erie should be understood as a nondelegation decision, Erie is more
than just a ticket good for one ride only. Instead, the Supreme Court has quite
properly extended Erie into other contexts, such as customary international
14 Id. at 612.
15 See id. at 606-14.
16 E.g., id. at 597 ("[O]ne strand of scholarship claims that any federal common law
that survived Erie is categorically suspect .... "); see also George D. Brown, Federal
Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New)
Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 241 (1992) ("The key theme ... is that doubts
about federal judicial lawmaking reflect concerns of separation of powers.... New Erie
... explain[s] why federal common law is suspect.").
17 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
18 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 614 ("I have no wish to unsettle the case in its
original and classic contexts .... My goal in criticizing only the constitutional basis of
Erie's 'old myth' is to foreclose the decision's expansion beyond its proper scope .... ").
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law. 19 Indeed, Erie arguably should be extended even further still into other
areas of law, such as antitrust, that also may pose nondelegation concerns.
But perhaps the most important "macro" benefit that results from
understanding Erie as a nondelegation decision is that our constitutional
structure is vindicated. The Constitution created each of the three branches of
government for different reasons. Significantly, Congress alone is entrusted
with legislative powers because Congress alone is institutionally designed to
use them well, and, equally significant, because Congress is uniquely
restrained in its ability to abuse them. Understanding Erie in nondelegation
terms preserves the constitutional demarcation between the powers of
Congress and the powers of the federal courts. Simply put, Swift had to go
because it is not the federal Judiciary's constitutional role to decide the hard
policy questions that are inherent in creating a national code of commercial
law. Congress, and only Congress, can do that.
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part II, this Article, following on
the work of Professor Craig Green and many others, will set out Erie and
address why traditional accounts of Erie's constitutional basis are flawed.
Professor Green is right that because the conventional justifications for Erie
are unsound, Erie should not be extended until we have a better
understanding of the principle that we are extending. As Professor Green
well explains, with constitutional law at stake, the blind must not lead the
blind.20
This Article breaks new ground, however, in Part III. Scholars have not
squarely assessed the nondelegation doctrine as a constitutional basis of Erie.
Part III will introduce the nondelegation doctrine, explain how it applies in
the context of delegations to the Judiciary, and show why this doctrine offers
an excellent account for Erie's holding. The core of the nondelegation
doctrine-the notion that "the basic policy decisions governing society are to
be made by the Legislature" 21-- can and should be applied to delegations to
both the Executive and Judicial Branches. Indeed, no less authority than
Chief Justice Marshall expressly explained that delegations to the Judiciary
are unconstitutional if the power being given is "strictly and exclusively
legislative." 22 Erie was such a case. Reading Erie as a nondelegation opinion
19 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (relying on Erie in the
context of the Alien Tort Statute).
20 See Green, supra note 11, at 614.
21 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.).
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explains why most federal common law is constitutional, while at the same
time demonstrating why Erie can be applied outside of the diversity context.
Part IV then sets out why reading Erie as a nondelegation case also
explains Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.23 In his critique of Erie's application
outside of the diversity context, Professor Green presents Sosa as Exhibit
One. 24 But if Erie is a nondelegation case, then Sosa makes sense too. There
are real nondelegation concerns posed by the Alien Tort Statute. Because
customary international law is nebulous, it would be an expansive delegation
of authority to empower Article III courts to decide what abstract customary
international law principles actually mean in practice and which causes of
action to recognize. So, in Sosa, the Supreme Court imposed limiting
principles on the reach of the statute 25 -an interpretative move that is
common in nondelegation cases. 26
Finally, Part V will address the Sherman Act-a chief piece of evidence
often offered for the notion that unbridled federal common law is
constitutional. 27 But this may be exactly backwards. While the Sherman Act
might suggest that Erie should not be regarded as a nondelegation case, the
Sherman Act can also be seen as the next target of Erie as a nondelegation
case. In other words, the doctrinal tension arguably should be resolved by
extending Erie into the antitrust context, just as it has been extended into the
customary international law context. Because the nondelegation doctrine
applies to the Judiciary, the way antitrust law has developed potentially may
be difficult to defend.28
II. ERIE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTIFICATION
We start on familiar but surprisingly unstable ground: Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins. Erie, of course, is more than just a case-it is an "icon."29
There are reasons for this iconic status. First, unlike some theoretically
fascinating legal questions that thankfully just don't come up all that often (if
23 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
24 See Green, supra note 11, at 598.
25 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
26 See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance,
2000 SuP. CT. REv. 223, 244-46 (2001).
27 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 619-20 ("[J]udicial doctrine [in the antitrust
context] often looks much like common law.").
28 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 405, 436 (2008); Andrew S.
Oldham, Sherman's March (in)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REv. 319, 324 (2007).
29 See Green, supra note 11, at 595.
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ever)30 or are purely academic, 31 or even pedantic,32 Erie is invoked daily by
the courts. 33 Second, Erie is the product of Justice Brandeis, 34 who was
finishing the work of Justice Holmes;35 Erie's most able defender is Judge
Friendly; 36 and Erie overturned Swift v. Tyson, the handiwork of Justice
Story.37 That is a murderers' row of judges. Third, Erie makes bold (indeed,
"hyperbolic" 38) declarations about what law is and what it is not39 -the sort
of categorical claims that keep people talking. 40 And finally, Erie is a
30 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession
Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REv. 113, 113 (1995) (arguing that it is
unconstitutional for members of Congress to be in the presidential line of succession);
Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 675, 677-78 (2005) (arguing that crime
committed in non-Wyoming portions of Yellowstone National Park may escape
punishment).
31 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 466, 466 (1983) (discussing which historical justice is the most
insignificant); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia
Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 291, 293 (2002) (discussing whether West Virginia
was properly admitted to the United States, a question that has surely been settled for all
practical purposes).
32 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 35 (1992) ("[M]any 'elite' law faculties in the
United States now have significant contingents of 'impractical' scholars .... The
'impractical' scholar-that is the term I will use-produces abstract scholarship that has
little relevance to concrete issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical
manner.").
33 According to WestlawNext, Erie itself was cited in at least 1870 cases from 2006
to 2008. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins KeyCite Citing References, WestlawNext,
https://next.westlaw.com (search for "304 U.S. 64"; then click "Citing References"; then
narrow to "Cases" and a date range of 2006-2008). This measure, of course, significantly
undercounts the number of times the Erie doctrine has been applied because Erie is so
well-known that it often need not be cited at all. Just as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), is not cited in every case in which judicial review is invoked, Erie is
not mentioned in every case in which state law is applied when a federal court is sitting in
diversity.
34 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Brandeis, J.).
35 See id. at 79 ("The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made
clear by Mr. Justice Holmes.").
36 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
37 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (Story, J.).
38 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 741 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
39 See, e.g., Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (rejecting the notion of "a transcendental body of
law").
40 Erie is one of the top ten most cited cases of all time. See Shane Marmion, Most-
Cited U.S. Supreme Court Cases in HeinOnline-Part 11, HEINONLINE BLOG (Feb. 16,
2009) http://home.heinonline.org/blog. According to Marmion's count, Erie has been
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constitutional case, and so is meant to last for the ages. With that
background, it is no surprise that Erie enjoys a prominent place in American
law.4 1
But for all of that, Erie's constitutional basis is draped in confusion.42 In
one sense, of course, Erie is settled. The Supreme Court's black-letter
holding-that, in diversity cases, the federal court applies the law of the state
in which it sits-is applied all the time. But despite boasting such a
recognizable holding, Erie's constitutional basis is famously opaque, 43
reflecting the uncomfortable truth that Erie's majority opinion at times seems
more like a Rorschach ink blot than reasoned analysis.44 The Supreme Court
made a constitutional holding-in fact, the Court overturned nearly a century
of law based on that constitutional holding-but it failed to specify the
constitutional basis of that holding. 45 This is a serious problem for Erie as a
judicial doctrine because Erie must itself be understood before it can
properly be applied in new contexts like customary international law. 46
Indeed, the foundational principle that Supreme Court decisions must be
understandable goes to the very heart of the Judicial Branch. "[Courts]
command no army ... [and] hold no purse. The only thing [they] have to
enforce [their] judgments is the power of [their] words."47 Thus, there must
be doctrine--"each legal decision should be referable to a rule or
principle." 48 After all, "[w]e want courts-and the Supreme Court is above
cited in scholarly journals more than 8,000 times, which is more than Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (6,835 times), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (7,299 times), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (6,926 times). See
Marmion, supra.
41 Cf Marion 0. Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent: 11, 40
TEX. L. REv. 619, 635 (1962) ("Like a religion, Erie has accumulated a fringe of
extremists, cultists and fanatics; like a religion too, it has its dissenters and protestants.").
42 See Green, supra note 11, at 596.
43 See id. at 596 n.4 (listing authorities that characterize Erie's reasoning as
"remarkably abbreviated," "murky," and "uncertain[]").
44 See, e.g., id. at 603-18 (listing different interpretations of Erie).
45 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 206
(1982) (reviewing TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT& ERIE CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981)) ("[Erie] is famous for ruling that in diversity cases
federal judges must apply the relevant state law and not some body of 'general common
law.' It is almost as famous for basing that decision on an uncertain constitutional
principle .... (footnote omitted)).
46 Cf Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004).
47 Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d
1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting).
4 8 CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT 2 (2004).
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all a court-to be bound by rules and principles," 49 because without such
doctrine, constitutional law is not "law" in any meaningful sense-it's just "a
set of political decisions made by politicians. ' 50 This is true for all cases, but
especially for extraordinarily important ones like Erie that, by their very
nature, bleed beyond their facts. 51
A. Setting the Stage: Swift v. Tyson
The story of Erie is well-known. In 1789, Congress enacted Section 34
of the First Judiciary Act-the Rules of Decision Act. In it, Congress
mandated "[t]hat the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply. '' 52 The two interpretations given
by the Supreme Court to this short sentence of statutory language have had
resounding repercussions for American constitutional law.
First, the "villain. '53 In 1842, the Supreme Court decided Swift v. Tyson.
This commercial law case concerned a bill of exchange and assignments. As
explained by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp:
[T]he question for decision was whether Swift, the holder of a bill of
exchange, was a holder in due course entitled to collect on the bill in spite
of a failure of consideration in the land transaction upon which the bill was
based. The general commercial law said that he could. New York decisional
law probably said that he could not. Justice Story applied the general
commercial law.54
To reach that conclusion, Justice Story had to confront the Rules of
Decision Act. Story succinctly "rejected the argument that section 34
required him to apply New York decisional law" because "[t]he word 'laws'
in section 34 ... refers to the 'rules and enactments promulgated by the
legislative authority' of a sovereign." 55 Story reasoned that "[i]n the ordinary
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See Green, supra note 11, at 602 (explaining the "iconic" role Erie plays in
American law). There is a reason, of course, why important cases inevitably creep into
new areas of law: "[T]he great majority of men"--including lawyers---"live like bats, but
in twilight, and know. . . the philosophy [and law] of their age only by its reflections and
refractions." SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, 3 ESSAYS ON His OWN TIMES 708 n.* (1850).
52 Federal Judiciary Act, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
53 Green, supra note 11, at 600.
54 Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 204.
55 Id. at 205 (quoting Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842)).
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use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of Courts
constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and
are not of themselves laws."'56 Thus, the Swift Court held that "section 34 did
not apply to the judicial decisions of state courts interpreting the common
law. A federal court deciding a diversity case was not statutorily obligated,
therefore, to follow the common law of a state as it would be applied if the
case were in state court."57
Justice Story also presented another rationale for the Court's conclusion:
In all the various cases which have hitherto come before us for decision,
this Court have [sic] uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of the
thirty-fourth section limited its application to state laws strictly local, that is
to say, to the positive statutes of the state .... It never has been supposed
by us, that the section .. . was designed to apply[] to questions of a more
general nature, not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a
fixed and permanent operation .... 58
These 'strictly local' [laws] ... included 'rights and titles to real estate, and
other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and
character.' 59 But, "[i]n the category of laws of a more 'general nature,' the
Justice included 'the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially.., questions of general commercial law .... "'60
Significantly, however, Justice Story was not making "a constitutional
decision" in Swift.61 His decision was wholly statutory.62 He read the Rules
56 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 205.
57 Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 205.
58 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 205.
59 Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 205 (quoting Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18).
60 Id. at 205-06 (quoting Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18) (second alteration in
original).
61 Id. at 204-05 ("It is important initially to recognize that for Justice Story Swift
was not a constitutional decision. It never occurred to him that article III, section 2 of the
Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States to controversies
'between Citizens of different States,' had anything to do with choice-of-law questions in
diversity cases.").
62 It is worth noting that there may have been sound policy reasons for that decision:
Swift enabled litigants and judges to determine the proper division of power between
states and federal government at a time when states were insular, parochial, inclined
to view themselves as small nations, and when the United States was struggling to
assert its national authority both internally and against the world.
Id. at 215. If the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to protect commerce, e.g., Henry J.
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 499 (1928)
("Not unnaturally the commercial interests of the country were reluctant to expose
themselves to the hazards of litigation before such courts as these."), then Swift may have
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of Decision Act to mean that unless a state statute was on point, the federal
courts themselves could "express [their] own opinion of the true result"-i.e.,
the legal rule-that should govern. 63 In other words, Justice Story held that
the word "laws" in Section 34 should be read narrowly to include only state
statutory laws, and, importantly for our purposes, he necessarily found that
Section 34 is an implicit delegation of power to the federal Judiciary to create
general common law.64
B. Changing the Law: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
The Swift regime screeched to a halt in Erie. "Every law student knows
the facts of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and can recite them from memory. '65 At
2:30 A.M. on July 27, 1934, Harry Tompkins, "a citizen of Pennsylvania,"
was walking home along the train tracks and "was injured ... by a passing
freight train of the Erie Railroad Company." 66 Tompkins sued in federal
court in New York, where the railroad had citizenship,
claim[ing] that the accident occurred through negligence in the operation, or
maintenance, of the train; that he was rightfully on the premises as licensee
because on a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance
helped effectuate that purpose. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in
the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1551, 1613-21 (2003)
(explaining why the Swift regime likely produced better law than the Erie regime). But
sound policy is not always good law.
63 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71
(1938) ("[Under Swift,] federal courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of
citizenship need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the
State as declared by its highest court; that they are free to exercise an independent
judgment as to what the common law of the State is-or should be .... ").
64 It is possible that Justice Story assumed federal courts have the power to craft
general common law because of the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article III itself. We
do not know how Justice Story conceived of Article III in Swift-because he did not
mention it. In fact, Justice Story did not make a constitutional argument at all. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 204-05. Note also that there is an argument that Swift
itself was rightly decided because "state and federal courts alike considered questions of
general commercial law at the time to be governed by the law merchant, a branch of the
law of nations," but that federal courts misapplied Swift's holding after the fact. See
Bradford R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1289, 1291-94 (2007).
For purposes of this Article, it is enough to say that by the time Erie was decided, federal
courts were interpreting the Rules of Decision Act as a broad, implicit delegation of
policymaking power in diversity suits.
65 Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 204. Alas, Professor Hovenkamp's statement is not
entirely true. The author has it on excellent authority that one can graduate from Yale
Law School without ever being taught Erie.
66 Erie, 304 U.S. at 69.
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alongside the tracks; and that he was struck by something which looked like
a door projecting from one of the moving cars. 67
The railroad disputed the claim, arguing that under Pennsylvania law,
"persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way-that is a
longitudinal pathway as distinguished from a crossing-are to be deemed
trespassers; and that the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered
trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful." 68
Tompkins responded, quite sensibly, that in the absence of state statutory law
"the railroad's duty and liability is to be determined in federal courts as a
matter of general law." 69 The basis for that argument was the "oft-challenged
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson. '" 70
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, with Justice Brandeis writing,
overruled Swift's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act--even though
neither party had challenged Swift nor asked that it be overruled. 71 Thus,
while the case before it was not briefed or argued in such overarching terms,
the Erie Court nonetheless held that
[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And
whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute
or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. 72
The matter was remanded to address the state law claims. 73 Swift was done.
The Erie Court gave a number of reasons why Swift had to go.
Preeminent was a policy argument: "Justice Brandeis's majority opinion first
condemned Swift['s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act] as
unworkable." 74 The Supreme Court explained that
[e]xperience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its
defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule
did not accrue. Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions
of common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering
6 7 Id.
68 Id. at 70.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 69; see also Green, supra note 11, at 600 & n.26 (noting criticisms of Swift).
71 Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
72 Id. at 78.
73 Id. at 80.
74 Green, supra note 11, at 601.
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a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and
that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties. 75
These practical problems, combined with forum shopping, 76 prodded the
Supreme Court to overthrow the Swift regime.
But the Supreme Court also gave more legalistic arguments for its
aggressive opinion. The Erie Court observed, for instance:
[M]ore recent research of a competent scholar, who examined the original
document [i.e., an early draft of the Rules of Decision Act], [has]
established that the construction given to it by the Court was erroneous; and
that the purpose of the section was merely to make certain that, in all
matters except those in which some federal law is controlling, the federal
courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply
as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written. 77
71 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (footnotes omitted). It should be noted, however, that
experience in applying Erie has also revealed serious conceptual defects, and it is
sometimes impossible to apply Erie in a satisfactory way. See Michael C. Dorf,
Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651, 695-715 (1995) (laying out the
conceptual difficulties inherent in making Erie predictions); see, e.g., Nolan v.
Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) ("Our principal
task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine what the New York courts would
think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought.").
76 See Green, supra note 11, at 601 n.28 ("'Criticism of the [Swift] doctrine became
widespread' as increasingly flagrant forum shoppers escaped unfavorable state common
law by invoking federal diversity jurisdiction." (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-76)).
According to Professor Green, the Supreme Court would have done well to have relied
exclusively on these pragmatic grounds to justify why Swift had to be overruled, without
mentioning any constitutional argument at all. See id. at 614-15 ("Every year, Civil
Procedure classes explain and justify Erie as a rule that avoids disparities and forum
shopping, while barely noting the decision's constitutional basis. This Article supports
that approach, and would take the added step of jettisoning such constitutional arguments
altogether."). But Erie does have a constitutional basis: the nondelegation doctrine.
77 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923)). In
particular, Professor Warren discovered an earlier draft of the statute which, in his view,
suggested that Swift was mistaken because the reference to "'laws of the several States"'
in the Rules of Decision Act was a stylistic "abbreviation" of the phrase "'the Statute law
of the several States in force for the time being and their unwritten and common law now
in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the
same, or otherwise."' Friendly, supra note 36, at 389. This scholarship is open to
question. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 207 ("Warren suggested that if Justice
Story had known in 1842 about this draft, Swift v. Tyson would have been decided the
other way. As some scholars have noted, however, the inferences to be drawn from
Ellsworth's original draft do not necessarily point in that direction." (footnote omitted)).
In any event,
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Importantly, however, Erie's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act
and the Supreme Court's rejection of Swift did not rest on these statutory
grounds alone, nor could they. As Justice Brandeis frankly acknowledged,
because of stare decisis, "[i]f only a question of statutory construction were
involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued
has now been made clear and compels us to do so."'78 In other words, Erie's
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act was explicitly driven by
constitutional analysis. Swift was not just wrong; it was unconstitutional, too.
Indeed, "[i]t is Erie's constitutional holding that has sustained the case's
iconic status through the years." 79
C. Why Previous Accounts of Erie's Constitutional Basis are
Inadequate
Unfortunately, 80 Justice Brandeis failed to specify why Swift's
interpretation was unconstitutional. 81 This is a serious problem, because
[o]n an issue of construction alone, it was not decisive in 1938 whether or not an
historian had discovered that in 1789 Ellsworth had meant, or even that the first
Congress had meant, something different from what Story, in 1842, had ruled they
meant. If ever Congress' reenactment of a statute or failure to alter it could fairly be
taken as approving a prior judicial interpretation, the unchanged existence of section
34 for a century after Story's construction was such a case.
Friendly, supra note 36, at 390 (footnote omitted).
78 Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
79 Green, supra note 11, at 602.
80 Professor Hovenkamp's critique of Erie is as cutting as it is understated. See, e.g.,
Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 206 n.32 ("Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie that the
'course pursued' in federal courts in diversity cases after Swift v. Tyson was
unconstitutional has prompted a great deal of comment, largely because Brandeis
neglected to mention which part of the Constitution he was referring to." (emphasis
added)). But even this criticism is too kind. The Erie Court deserves no "praise" for
issuing an opaque, poorly-explained constitutional decision. Justice Butler was entirely
correct on this point:
This Court has often emphasized its reluctance to consider constitutional questions,
and that legislation will not be held invalid as repugnant to the fundamental law if
the case may be decided upon any other ground. In view of grave consequences
liable to result from erroneous exertion of its power to set aside legislation, the
Court should move cautiously, seek assistance of counsel, act only after ample
deliberation, show that the question is before the Court, that its decision cannot be
avoided by construction of the statute assailed or otherwise, indicate precisely the
principle or provision of the Constitution held to have been transgressed, and fully
disclose the reasons and authorities found to warrant the conclusion of invalidity.
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constitutional law is serious business.8 2 According to traditional accounts, in
Erie, "[t]he Court stated several grounds for its decision: equal protection,
legal positivism, and federalism." 83 For reasons that will be explained
below,84 there are also hints of the nondelegation doctrine in Erie. But first
let's pause and see why previous accounts of Erie are flawed.
1. Equal Protection and Legal Positivism
We can make short work of two possible justifications for Erie: equal
protection and legal positivism. Neither is even plausible.
To be sure, one reason Erie gave for overruling Swift was that Swift
"rendered impossible equal protection of the law."8 5 And in a sense, of
course, that was true: "Swift caused disparities between litigants in federal
court and litigants in state court; the former were governed by federal general
common law, the latter by state law."8 6 Justice Brandeis's incantation of
"equal protection" thus superficially sounds like a weighty argument. But
upon reflection it is apparent that this reference to "equal protection" is
Erie, 304 U.S. at 87 (Butler, J., dissenting). Put differently, imagine if the Court in
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 50 (2010), had decided the constitutional question
without briefing and without explication, and then you have Erie-except Erie really did
overturn nearly "a century of law"! See, e.g., Mark Memmott, IfAlito Did Say 'Not True'
About Obama's Claim, He May Have Had a Point, THE Two-WAY: NPR's NEWS BLOG
(Jan. 28, 2010, 6:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2010/01/ifalito didsaynottrue abou.html (noting that President Obama was
mistaken to say that Citizens United overturned "a century of law").
81 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 602 (observing that Erie's constitutional
analysis contained "just three sentences of original reasoning").
82 Cf Emily's List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Brown, J., concurring)
("Before reaching a constitutional question, a federal court should ... consider whether
there is a nonconstitutional ground for deciding the case, and if there is, dispose of the
case on that ground. My colleagues duck this rule, preferring to summon the awesome
power of Marbury v. Madison. But in their eagerness to play John Marshall, they do not
follow him. The Great Chief Justice himself cautioned: 'No questions can be brought
before a judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve the
constitutionality of a legislative act. If they become indispensably necessary to the case,
the court must meet and decide them,' but if not, 'a just respect for the legislature
requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly
assailed."' (citations omitted) (quoting Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D.
Va. 1833) (No. 11,558)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 602.
84 See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
85 Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
86 Green, supra note 11, at 603.
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"insignificant" as a statement of constitutional law. 87 As put by Professor
Green:
When Brandeis wrote that disparate treatment based on litigants' state
citizenship denied "equal protection," however, he spoke at most in a
colloquial sense. Erie did not-and could not-reverse Swift as violating
the constitutional equal protection. Until the 1954 desegregation case
Boiling v. Sharpe, it was unclear whether even racial discrimination by the
federal government violated equal protection [by reverse incorporation
under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause]. Boiling was in no sense
foreshadowed by Erie's throwaway sentence about discrimination against
diverse litigants.
Even under today's broadened view of equal protection, the
Constitution does not bar using different substantive rules in federal and
state courts. Conventional choice of law analysis often applies different
states' substantive law based on the parties' citizenship; such decisions do
not implicate the racial, sexual, or fundamental-rights discrimination that
today merits heightened scrutiny. Nor did Swifi-era federal practice lack a
rational basis; rather, Swift-era federal courts sought to apply better
substantive law, which would clearly satisfy permissive modem scrutiny. 88
Moreover, "Erie's reference to 'equal protection' appears in a
preliminary section of the opinion describing the 'political and social' defects
of the Swift doctrine rather than the section specifically addressing 'the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued.'89 This too strongly suggests that
equal protection was not the constitutional basis for Erie.
Nor does Erie's legendary invocation of legal positivism provide a sound
constitutional foundational for Erie-at least by itself.90 Famously, Justice
"Brandeis quoted a Holmes dissent condemning Swift's 'fallacy' that federal
general common law was a 'transcendental body... outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it." ' 91 Erie thus "is one of the United States
Supreme Court's most definitive statements of legal positivism." 92 But
87 Id.
88 Id. (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
89 Clark, supra note 64, at 1299 (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78).
90 For reasons that are explained below, legal positivism is relevant if Erie is
understood as a nondelegation case. See discussion infra Parts HI.B.2, III.B.3. But it is
not a sound basis in its own right.
91 Green, supra note 11, at 604 (alteration in original) (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 79);
see also Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84
VA. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1998) (explaining why legal positivism does not explain or
justify the Erie decision).
92 Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 224.
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"judicial lawmaking does not violate legal positivism" so long as positive
law provides for it.93 Critically, there was a statute in Erie: the Rules of
Decision Act.94 Accordingly, the Swift regime was grounded in positive law
too: "As a constitutional argument, the Holmesian position [thus] turns a
colorful phrase, but is short on substance." 95
2. Enumerated Powers
The best traditional argument for Erie sounds in the principle of
enumerated powers. This theory posits that under Swift, federal courts could
make law in areas where Congress did not have the power to regulate, and so
Swift was an unconstitutional exercise of power by the federal government
vis-A-vis the States. This argument has the charm of at least being plausible.
But again, upon reflection, this argument cannot withstand scrutiny-unless
we accept that the Erie Court was blind to the facts before it.
The "case or controversy" 96 at issue in Erie-a tort involving an
interstate train-was surely within Congress's competence. 97 And even more
fundamentally, if Erie's constitutional ruling rests entirely on an enumerated
powers justification, then it is a narrow ruling indeed. It would be open to
Congress to amend the Rules of Decision Act to resurrect Swift, so long as it
included a token reference to matters "in or affecting interstate commerce."
Properly understood, Erie is not so limited.
At first blush, Erie can be read as an enumerated powers case like United
States v. Lopez98 or United States v. Morrison.99 The Erie Court, after all,
was (rightly) concerned by Swift's usurpation of state powers, noting that
"Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts," nor does any "clause in the
Constitution purport[] to confer such a power upon the federal courts."100
This is a forceful claim. If Congress-the lawmaking branch-lacks the
power to regulate in some field, then common sense says that Congress
cannot give power to regulate that field to another branch. In other words,
93 Green, supra note 11, at 605.
94 To be sure, the Act may have been misinterpreted by Swift as a matter of statutory
interpretation, but misreading a statute, assuming that Swift did misread the statute, does
not somehow violate legal positivism.
95 Green, supra note 11, at 604.
96 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
97 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
98 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
99 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
100 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
[Vol. 72:2
ERIE AS NONDELEGA TION
this enumerated powers argument posits that because "[s]ome cases heard by
federal courts under Article III and the diversity statute concern purely
intrastate, noncommercial matters, which Congress could not regulate as
interstate commerce or under other Article I powers," Swift was
unconstitutional because Congress cannot "expand federal legislative powers
simply by shifting lawmaking duties to the courts." 101 Congress simply
cannot give away more than it has.
Judge Friendly made this argument best. As he explained, if we were to
imagine "an act of Congress depriving charities of immunity in tort," most
would agree "that such a statute is neither within any power enumerated in
section 8 of Article I nor within the 'necessary and proper' clause insofar as
that relates to implementing Congress' enumerated powers."' 1 2 The statute
would regulate conduct that is not in interstate commerce, and it is
unreasonable to conclude that the Constitution hangs "so important an
assignment of legislative power ... on so inconspicuous a peg" as the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 10 3 With this as our premise, "it would be even
more unreasonable to suppose that the federal courts have a law-making
power which the federal legislature does not." 10 4 Instead "in the case of a
government whose legislature has only such powers as are specifically
granted," like ours, it cannot be that federal courts can "make law without
possibility of Congressional correction."'10 5 Thus, when federal courts act in
diversity cases, they cannot go beyond the power that Congress has.
Concluding Judge Friendly's argument, because Swift's interpretation of the
Rules of Decision Act allowed federal judges "to declare rules of decision
101 Green, supra note 11, at 612.
102 Friendly, supra note 36, at 394.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 395.
105 Id. This point is especially important. The creation of diversity jurisdiction in
Article III should not be construed as an independent source of power for federal courts
to craft law wholly independent of any congressional authorization. It strains logic to say
that the Constitution creates an elaborate lawmaking process that only gives "legislative
powers" to Congress, while at the same time empowering the Judiciary to bypass that
lawmaking process with wide-spread independent action. Indeed, as explained below, it
is not without reason that only Congress is given such "legislative powers." See infra text
accompanying notes 135-47. Thus, as Judge Friendly wisely observed, consistent with
the constitutional order, it simply cannot be that Article III itself authorizes a Swif-like
regime. See Friendly, supra note 36, at 394-95. Moreover, as noted above, there is no
indication in Swift that Justice Story believed that Article III granted federal courts such a
power. See supra note 64. Finally, also as detailed below, Chief Justice Marshall
expressly explained that the nondelegation doctrine applies to the Judiciary, see infra text
accompanying notes 166-67, suggesting afortiori that courts lack the power to make law
absent any delegation at all.
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which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes," that
interpretation of the statute must fail.106
Judge Friendly's constitutional reasoning is elegant. But there is a fatal
flaw: Erie was not a "gap" case. As even Friendly himself was forced to
concede (albeit in a footnote):
Erie differed from the hypothetical [charity immunity] case in that Congress
could permissibly have legislated as to its subject-matter; it is scarcely
doubtful that Mr. Justice Brandeis would have sustained, or that the present
Court would sustain, an act of Congress establishing uniform rules of tort
liability by interstate railroads to persons coming on their property. On this
view, the statement as to lack of Congressional power, although generally
valid, may have been inappropriate to the case at hand .... But the Court
was approaching the issue in terms more general than Mr. Tompkins'
case. 107
In other words, under Judge Friendly's theory, the Supreme Court in Erie
was answering a question that the "case or controversy" actually before the
Court did not and could not present. 10 8 That is hardly "praise" for Erie.10 9
Professor Green, like many others, 10 seizes on this incongruity in Judge
Friendly's reasoning to claim that "[t]he problem with Erie's enumerated-
powers argument is that any 'gap' between Article III diversity jurisdiction
and Article I legislative power is too small to explain Erie, much less justify
the wholesale reversal of Swifi-era common law."'' 1 And, in any event, for
good or for ill, precedent holds that "Congress's commerce power is also
greater now than in 1938."' 12 In sum, if Erie is an enumerated powers case, it
is wrongly decided both on its own terms and in relation to subsequent
Commerce Clause law.
The Tenth Amendment fares no better. If the Tenth Amendment is just
the "mirror" of Congress's enumerated powers, then it falls in tandem with
the Commerce Clause. 113 And even if the Tenth Amendment provides an
independent basis to vindicate state sovereignty, Erie does not fit as a Tenth
Amendment case. "After all, Swift's federal general common law did not
'commandeer' state officials, nor did it even preempt state law as applied in
106 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938).
107 Friendly, supra note 36, at 397 n.66 (second emphasis added).
108 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
109 Friendly, supra note 36, at 383.
110 E.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1639, 1657-59 (2008).
111 Green, supra note 11, at 612.
112 Id at 613 (citing, inter alia, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22-23 (2005)).
113 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57, 187-88 (1992).
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state court." 114 Likewise, Swift did not infringe on "'functions essential to
[states'] separate and independent existence,' 115 nor is it obvious that Swift
intruded on any "'traditional aspect[] of state sovereignty.""' 6 The Tenth
Amendment cannot explain Erie either.117
There is, of course, an obvious counter-argument to all of this: "So
what?" Why does it matter that Erie's particular facts are not consistent with
an enumerated powers argument, so long as the law is right as a general
matter? The Supreme Court is frequently sloppy-it reaches out to decide
questions that are not squarely presented and overrules cases all the time-
and it often makes broad constitutional rulings when more narrow ones
would do. It does not follow that the constitutional rulings we get from those
sloppy cases do not somehow "count." In other words, if Erie reached the
correct constitutional result (i.e., Swift unconstitutionally allowed federal
courts to make law beyond Congress's enumerated powers), then why does it
matter going forward-that is, to anyone but the parties in Erie-whether the
Court picked a poor factual vehicle to state a correct principle of
constitutional law?
It matters for three related reasons. First, if the Erie Court overreached
and made a rule that applies to cases that fall both within and without
Congress's enumerated powers when the constitutional reasoning only
supports the latter, then why does not Swift still apply for cases that are
within Congress's enumerated powers? Second, if Erie rests on enumerated
power grounds, and it is stare decisis that is holding Swift back today even
for cases within Congress's enumerated powers, then Erie is a narrow ruling
indeed. All Congress would have to do is re-enact Swift with a Commerce
Clause hook, and then we would have Swift 2.0, which would be almost
identical to the original scheme. There is, however, no suggestion in Erie to
conclude that the Court intended such a narrow decision. Finally, and most
importantly, if Erie rests on enumerated powers grounds, then it does not
explain the Court's subsequent extension of Erie into new areas of law that
do fall squarely within Congress's power, such as customary international
law. This is Professor Green's point.' 18 Enumerated powers cannot explain
Erie as it now operates in constitutional law, as reflected in cases like Sosa.
114 Green, supra note 11, at 609 (citing, inter alia, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997)).
115 Id. at 610 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
116 Id. at 610 (alterations in original) (quoting Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 849 (1976)).
117 See Clark, supra note 64, at 1298-99 (explaining why the Tenth Amendment is
inapt).
118 Green, supra note 11, at 614-15.
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If the Erie doctrine is to be explained as it now exists, there must be a
different ground than enumerated powers.
3. The Supremacy Clause
Because traditional accounts of Erie are unsatisfactory, Professor
Branford Clark has advanced another constitutional reason why Swift had to
go: the Supremacy Clause.' 19 This argument is based on the structural claim
that to be valid federal "law," law must be made with the "assent of the states
or their representatives in the Senate."' 120 There is much to commend in this
argument. As Professor Green notes, however, this ambitious (and intuitively
appealing) argument cannot be reconciled with longstanding precedent if it
means that federal courts cannot create common law at all. 121
But Professor Clark's position is more subtle than that. He suggests that
federal courts can indeed create common law-if"[]authorized by Congress"
to do so. 122 But he claims that there was no such authorization in Erie
because "the Swift doctrine eventually degenerated into an excuse for federal
119 See Clark, supra note 64, at 1289-90 (citing Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last
Words on Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1682, 1688 (1974)); id. at 1302 ("Thus, in the absence
of an applicable rule of decision supplied by the 'Constitution,' 'Laws,' or 'Treaties' of
the United States [the three parts of the Supremacy Clause], federal courts simply lack
constitutional authority to disregard state law. In this sense, the precise constitutional
source of the Erie decision is the Supremacy Clause.").
120 Id. at 1290.
121 See, e.g., Craig Green, Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 661, 661-62 (2008) ("Despite the impressive quality and breadth of Clark's work,
this Essay disputes his view that the Supremacy Clause is a constitutional basis for Erie"
because it would "invalidate most (or all) federal common law."). Professor Green also
notes that Swift's general common law was not "supreme law" in that state courts did not
need to follow it, and that "an equally valid inference might suggest that supreme
preemptive federal law must satisfy different constitutional standards than non-supreme
federal law like Swift." See id. at 665-66. Professor Clark ably parries, however, by
noting that "[t]he Constitution does not recognize a category of non-supreme federal law
that federal courts are free to make on their own initiative." Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CAL. L. REv.
699, 708 (2008).
122 Clark, supra note 64, at 1301-02 (emphasis added) ("Apart from any
constitutional limits on the scope of federal power in general, '[p]rinciples related to the
separation of powers impose an additional limit on the authority of federal courts to
engage in lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress).' (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Mishkin, supra note 119, at 1683)); see also id. at 1310-11
(citing, inter alia, Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825))
(recognizing that if there has been a constitutionally valid delegation, then a judge-made
rule does not run afoul of his conception of the Supremacy Clause).
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courts to make their own body of law in diversity cases." 123 He argues that
Swift was unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because federal
judges were making law that Congress never empowered them to make.
Professor Clark's argument is important, but there is a loophole: It only
works if Swift, as interpreted and applied by courts at the time of Erie, was
wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation-in other words, that Congress
did not authorize it. On the other hand, if Swift and the cases that followed it
were right that Congress had implicitly delegated such broad authority to the
federal bench, i.e., that the Rules of Decision Act actually authorized the
creation of general common law, then Clark's Supremacy Clause concerns
presumably are met. 124
Indeed, even if Swift and later cases were wrong on that question of
statutory interpretation, there is a good argument that stare decisis still ought
to have applied. After all, surely a court is not violating the Supremacy
Clause every time it innocently misinterprets a statute, even though the
resulting interpretation does not reflect the "assent of the states or their
representatives in the Senate."' 125 (Were it otherwise, every statutory case
would be a constitutional case for purposes of stare decisis.) And if the
federal courts were "authorized" to create federal common law---either
because Swifi was right as a matter of interpretation or because of stare
decisis-then Professor Clark's Supremacy Clause argument is beside the
point.
4. Another Constitutional Basis Is Required for Erie
In sum, previous justifications for Erie are wanting. Unless another
constitutional basis can be offered, Professor Green has, at least, a solid
footing to argue that Erie should not be "expan[ded] beyond its proper scope:
federal courts deciding legal issues commonly heard in state court," and that
we should "jettison[] such constitutional arguments altogether.' ' 126 But there
is another basis for Erie: the nondelegation doctrine.
123 Id. at 1309 (emphasis added).
124 To be sure, Professor Clark at times seems to make broader arguments that
suggest that even if Congress did authorize such judicial lawmaking, it would be
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. E.g., Clark, supra note 121, at 715-19. He
does not, however, ground his Erie argument in nondelegation cases like Panama
Refining and Schechter Poultry. Nonetheless, his argument and this Article work in
tandem: If Congress did not authorize the Swift regime, then it was unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause; if Congress did authorize the Swift regime, then it was
unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.
125 Clark, supra note 64, at 1290.
126 Green, supra note 11, at 614-15.
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The nondelegation doctrine, moreover, does something different than
either of the two plausible competing visions of Erie just set forth-
enumerated powers (per Judge Friendly) or the Supremacy Clause (per
Professor Clark). On both of those readings of Erie, Congress could amend
the Rules of Decision Act to reinvigorate Swift-for instance by either
adding a Commerce Clause hook or by expressly authorizing the creation of
federal common law. Both views are wrong-Erie's holding is not so
narrow. Instead, consistent with the claims made by the Erie Court itself,
Congress could not bring back Swift even if Congress wanted to do so. 12 7
The nondelegation doctrine stands in the way.
III. ERIE AS NONDELEGATION
Because Erie cannot be justified by previous explanations, to be valid
Erie must be explained in some other way. This "other way" must be the
separation of powers. 128 But what type of separation of powers argument fits
Erie? This question matters because separation of powers comes in different
flavors. An especially sharp view of the separation of powers might suggest
that all federal common law is unconstitutional. 129 Or a diluted version of
that sharp argument might be that all federal law is presumptively
unconstitutional, subject to reluctant acquiescence for special
circumstances. 130
While those are separation of powers arguments, and though they are not
without appeal as a theoretical matter, they cut too broadly in light of the
actual precedent that is on the books. It does not fit with our country's
unbroken line of practice to say that federal courts cannot make common law
or that it is presumptively unconstitutional for them to do so. Federal courts
do make common law, they always have made common law, and most times
when they make federal common law it is not constitutionally problematic.
Indeed, federal courts have been specifically empowered to make federal
127 E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 88 (1938) (Butler, J., dissenting)
("Indeed, it would have been appropriate to give Congress opportunity to be heard before
devesting it of power to prescribe rules of decision to be followed in the courts of the
United States." (emphasis added)).
128 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 637 (noting that many have concluded that
Erie must be grounded in the separation of powers or not at all); Young, supra note 110,
at 1657-59 (explaining why a separation of powers argument is necessary).
129 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 637 (noting that some believe there should be
no federal common law, "with only a few grudging exceptions").
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common law since the very beginning of the Republic. 131 But just because
some separation of powers arguments are too ambitious, it does not follow
that they all are. The nondelegation doctrine provides an excellent account
for the holding in Erie and the Court's extension of Erie beyond the diversity
context.
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite
system of Government."'132 Because "[t]he Constitution provides that '[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States,"' the Court has "insisted that 'the integrity and maintenance of the
system of government ordained by the Constitution' mandate that Congress
generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.' 1 33 In
other words, precedent holds that "[w]hile Congress is free to seek help from
the other branches, there is a core of legislative power that Congress cannot
give away without violating the constitutional separation of powers."' 134
Thus, while "[t]he line between proper delegations and prohibited transfers
of 'legislative' power is not a bright one,.... [n]evertheless, the basic notion
that the Constitution imposes some restrictions on Congress's ability to
delegate lawmaking authority away is deeply entrenched in constitutional
law and widely accepted in constitutional commentary."' 135
Start with first principles. The Constitution carefully confers powers on
all three branches of government. 136 Importantly, each branch's power is
distinct in text, history, and purpose. 137 It is fanciful to think that this
allocation of powers is unimportant in the constitutional scheme. The
nondelegation doctrine therefore is based on the commonsensical premise
that the Constitution's formal structure must be respected.
131 See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 28, at 411 ("From the early days of the Republic,
Congress voluntarily has ceded-'delegated,' in common parlance-substantial
lawmaking powers to members of both the executive and judicial branches.").
132 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
133 Id. at 371-72 (second alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1).
134 See Lemos, supra note 28, at 407.
135 Id. at 413.
136 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I (Congress), with id. art. II (the Presidency), with id.
art. III (the Judiciary).
137 Compare THE FEDERALIST Nos. 52-58, 62-63 (James Madison), NOs. 59-61,
65-66 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 64 (John Jay) (explaining the powers of the legislative
branch), with id. Nos. 67-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the powers of the
executive branch), with id. Nos. 78-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the powers of
the judicial branch).
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But the nondelegation doctrine is more than just formalism-though
"[l]ong live formalism"! 138 It is also functional. Congress is the only branch
that is entrusted with "legislative powers." This is by design. The reason why
Congress is entrusted with legislative powers is that it is uniquely able to use
them well, 139 and, equally important, because it is uniquely confined in its
ability to abuse them. 140 To ensure that this functional reality is respected,
Congress must be the branch that exercises whatever legislative power is
granted to the federal government. 141
Accordingly, while "'the nondelegation principle seems to raise the
burdens and costs associated with the enactment of federal law,"",142 and so
"may create a 'status quo bias' . . . , these 'burdens and costs' can also be
seen as 'an important guarantor of individual liberty, because they ensure
that national governmental power may not be brought to bear against
138 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
139 A cursory review of Article I demonstrates that Congress is specifically designed
to exercise legislative powers. Congress, for instance, is built to encourage unrestrained
debate: "The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the
government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or
threats from the Executive Branch." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972)
(discussing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1). Likewise, Congress has Members from
throughout the nation, ensuring that many points of view are represented. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3.
140 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 GREEN BAG (2d) 191,
202 (2007) ("Madison and Hamilton, at least, explicitly recognized and reported what (I
think) the structure makes obvious: bicameralism and presentment make lawmaking
difficult by design. Their remarks on this point began as concessions. Madison thus
acknowledged that 'this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be
injurious as well as beneficial.' Hamilton likewise allowed that 'the power of preventing
bad laws includes that of preventing good ones.' But both quickly claimed those troubling
features as virtues. Madison emphasized that 'the facility and excess of law-making,' and
not the converse, 'seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable.'
And for Hamilton, '[t]he injury which may possibly be done by defeating afew good laws
will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.' The
trade-off evident in the structure of Article I, Section 7 was not merely acknowledged,
but endorsed by the document's strongest defenders." (alteration in original) (second and
third emphases added) (footnotes omitted)).
141 Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1422 (2008)
("The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in Article 1, Section 1, and in the Court's view, its
purpose is therefore to require that laws are made by the national legislature.").
142 Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62
ADMIN. L. REv. 19, 55 (2010) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 5, at 320).
143 Id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 246
(2006).
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individuals without a consensus, established by legislative agreement on
relatively specific words.'"144 Or, "[a]s [Professor John] Manning puts it,"
"Even the quickest look at the constitutional structure reveals that the
design of bicameralism and presentment disfavors easygoing, high volume
lawmaking." Indeed, "the cumbersomeness of the [constitutional] process
seems obviously suited to interests that contradict the 'more is better'
attitude that has come to be almost an unconscious assumption of public
law." Because delegation enables "lawmaking on the cheap," adherence to
the nondelegation doctrine safeguards important "interests by forcing
specific policies through the process of bicameralism and presentment."
Moreover, "the nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule of law values"
similar to those protected by "the void for vagueness doctrine" in the
criminal context. For instance, "By ensuring that those asked to implement
the law be bound by intelligible principles, the nondelegation doctrine"
serves the purpose of "provid[ing] fair notice to affected citizens and also to
discipline the enforcement discretion of unelected administrators and
bureaucrats." 145
Likewise (and reminiscent of Professor Clark's Supremacy Clause
argument set forth above), 146 the nondelegation doctrine can be
conceptualized as a protector of federalism. If federal power has not been
exercised, then state law has not been preempted. 147 The upshot is that the
easier it is to make federal law, the more state law will be set aside. The
constitutional structure exists, in part, to ensure that before state law is
preempted, the matter has been thoroughly examined in the Nation's
legislature. 148 If Congress can delegate its power to other branches of the
federal government, then more policy will be governed by federal law than
would otherwise occur. Indeed, "[t]he greatest threats to state autonomy
arise, not surprisingly, out of ... lawmaking by executive agencies and
courts, neither of which are accountable to the states and each of which may
produce law considerably more easily than Congress."' 149 The nondelegation
144 Id. (quoting Sunstein, supra note 5, at 320).
145 Id. (second and third alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Manning, supra note 140, at 198-99; Manning, supra note 26, at 240; Sunstein, supra
note 5, at 320).
146 See supra Part II.C.3.
147 E.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("Suffice it to say that due regard for our federalism, in its practical operation,
favors survival of the reserved authority of a State over matters that are the intimate
concern of the State unless Congress has clearly swept the boards of all State authority, or
the State's claim is in unmistakable conflict with what Congress has ordered.").
148 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 64, at 1289-90.
149 Young, supra note 110, at 1659.
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doctrine, as with other separation of powers doctrines, 150 thus rightly plays
an important role in constitutional law.
1. The Nondelegation Doctrine Logically Applies to Both the Executive
and Judicial Branches
The nondelegation doctrine as applied to the Executive Branch has
received far more than its fair share of ink-including this author's. 151
Surprisingly, however, little attention has been directed towards the
nondelegation doctrine's "blind spot" 152 : delegations to courts. This is a
mistake because the nondelegation doctrine has application for both the
Executive and Judicial Branches. As Professor Margaret Lemos has
thoughtfully written, "Just as agencies exercise a lawmaking function when
they fill in the gaps left by broad [statutory] delegations of power, so too do
courts." 15 3 Thus, though the nondelegation doctrine "typically [is] considered
only with respect to agencies, the constitutional principles underlying the
doctrine apply with full force to delegations to courts." 154 Professor Lemos
also observes that there is no historical support for the notion that "the phrase
'the judicial power' in Article III necessarily connotes a lawmaking
function,"' 155 and that even if lawmaking is inherent in the judicial act, it is a
"mistake[]" to replace "a question of degree for a question of kind."'156
In light of the discussion of the constitutional structure set out above, it is
apparent that comparable constitutional concerns arise when "legislative"
power is delegated to either the Executive or Judicial Branch. After all, in
either scenario, a branch of the federal government other than the Legislature
is making federal law. Thus, "to the extent that lawmaking by agencies
triggers constitutional anxieties about the proper allocation of power among
the three branches, so too should delegated lawmaking by courts." 157
150 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3151-61 (2010); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
151 See, e.g., Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142; Aaron Nielson, An Indirect
Argument for Limiting Presidential Power, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727, 739, 745
(2007).
152 See Lemos, supra note 28, at 407.
153 Id. at 408.
154 Id. at 405.
155 Id. at 440.
156 Id. at 441-42. Professor Lemos's analysis is theoretically compelling. But it
lacks a defining precedent-i.e., an actual case in which the nondelegation doctrine was
applied to the Judiciary in a significant way. As discussed below, this Article builds upon
Professor Lemos's excellent work by providing that signature case: Erie.
157 See id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
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This conclusion is bolstered by then-Justice Rehnquist's well-known
concurrence in the Benzene Case.'58 There, Rehnquist explained the benefits
of the nondelegation doctrine in a way that is equally applicable when
Congress delegates power to courts as when Congress delegates power to
agencies. He wrote:
[T]he nondelegation doctrine serves three important functions. First, and
most abstractly, it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are
made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the
popular will. Second, the doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress
finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that
authority with an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the
delegated discretion. Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine
ensures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated
legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable
standards. 159
Tellingly, nothing in Justice Rehnquist's statement is limited to
delegations to the Executive Branch-and for good reason. Courts are many
things, but they are not more "responsive to the popular will" than is
Congress. Instead, by constitutional design, courts are less politically
accountable than both Congress and administrative agencies. 160 There also is
no reason why the "intelligible principle" requirement should change when a
court and not an agency is the delegate; as Justice Rehnquist made clear, the
purpose of the "intelligible principle" is to make sure that Congress sets
policy with a standard that can be ascertained. 161 Thus, the nondelegation
doctrine should not be applied with less vigor in the judicial context than in
the agency context.
158 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 685-
86 (1980).
159 Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted). It should be noted that there is
a vigorous debate about whether the nondelegation doctrine has a constitutional basis in
the first place. Compare, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHi. L. REv. 1721, 1723 (2002) (arguing there is no
constitutional basis), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CI. L. REV. 1297
(2003) (defending the doctrine). This Article, of course, sides with the doctrine's
defenders.
160 See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 28, at 449-50; Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at
25 (explaining that Chevron USA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), is largely based on the fact that courts have less "political
accountability" than agencies).
161 Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 685-86.
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On the other hand, there are compelling reasons why, "[i]f anything," the
nondelegation doctrine should be applied with "special concern" in the
context of delegations to the Judiciary. 162 Generalist judges are "not experts"
and they "encounter issues one case at a time, which may make it hard for
them to see the big picture."' 163 As just explained, courts are less politically
accountable than either the Executive or Legislative Branches. Federal
judges have life tenure and salary protection for a reason, but that reason is
not political accountability. 164 "Thus, even if there are good reasons for the
Court's hands-off approach to agency-administered statutes, the usual lines
of defense cannot be used to justify broad delegations to courts." 165
2. History Confirms that the Nondelegation Doctrine Applies to Courts
Even though it makes conceptual sense to apply the nondelegation
doctrine to courts, one obvious question is whether there is any historical
justification for doing so. Law, like life, is often inconsistent, so just because
Euclid might treat delegations to the Judicial Branch the same as delegations
to the Executive Branch, it does not follow that the Constitution compels that
logical consistency. Indeed, one must be wary before letting "logic" take
162 Lemos, supra note 28, at 409.
163 Id. at 445-46.
164 See, e.g., United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 568-69 (2001) (explaining why
federal courts are politically independent, and quoting Chief Justice Marshall's
observation that "[a] judge may have to decide 'between the Government and the man
whom that Government is prosecuting: between the most powerful individual in the
community, and the poorest and most unpopular.' A judge's decision may affect an
individual's 'property, his reputation, his life, his all.' In the 'exercise of these duties,' the
judge must 'observe the utmost fairness.' The judge must be 'perfectly and completely
independent, with nothing to influence or contro[l] him but God and his conscience.' The
'greatest scourge ... ever inflicted,' Marshall thought, 'was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a
dependent Judiciary."' (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-
1830, at 616, 619 (1830))).
165 Lemos, supra note 28, at 409. "Indeed, delegations to courts may be particularly
problematic given the considerable differences between courts and agencies in terms of
institutional design and capacity." Id. at 408-09. Professor Young makes a similar point:
These structural safeguards [such as oversight hearings and the like] are integral to
the constitutional compromise that has at least papered over the inconsistency of
broad agency delegations with Article I's vesting of the legislative power in
Congress. None of these safeguards can be invoked to support the exercise of
delegated lawmaking authority by courts.
Young, supra note 110, at 1667 (footnote omitted).
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precedence over experience when assessing the separation of powers. 166 "[A]
page of history," Justice Holmes reminds us, "is worth a volume of logic."'
67
In this case, however, history actually confirms that the nondelegation
doctrine applies to the Judiciary too.
First, consider John Locke, the most famous father of the nondelegation
principle. In an oft-quoted passage from his Second Treatise of Government,
Locke wrote:
The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that
positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of
making laws, and place it in other hands.
... The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making
laws to any body [sic] else, or place it any where [sic], but where the people
have. 16 8
There is no indication that those "other hands" can only be in the
Executive Branch-indeed, "the executive power originally consisted of the
present-day categories of executive power and judicial power," and "Locke
... sometimes used executive power to cover both the familiar executive
power and the judicial power."' 69
166 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1121
(1994) ("Before we embark on any mission to tinker with the constitutional separation of
powers, we would do well to heed Edmund Burke's admonition to proceed with 'infinite
caution .... '). See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE 220 (J. C. D. Clark ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790) ("The science of
government being therefore so practical in itself, and intended for such practical
purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person
can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite
caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered
in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or of building it up
again, without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.").
167 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
168 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 75 (C. B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
169 Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 701, 742 n.195 (2003).
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Second, consider also the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the first
Justice to invoke the nondelegation principle. "The Great Chief Justice"'170
expressly recognized in Wayman v. Southard that the nondelegation doctrine
applies to the Judiciary. Writing for the Court, he unambiguously stated that
"[i]t will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any
other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative."' 171 This
is compelling authority from the Republic's early days, and from one of the
Court's most thunderous voices, that the nondelegation doctrine applies with
at least equal force in the judicial context.
Because the case is so important to understanding the nondelegation
doctrine, it is worth pausing for a moment to examine Wayman. There, "the
Court considered a challenge" to the federal Judiciary's power to make its
own procedural rules. 172 Specifically,
[t]he Process Act required federal courts in common law actions to apply
the procedural rules that existed as of 1789 in the states in which they sat,
"subject however to such alterations and additions as the said courts
respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to such regulations
as the Supreme Court shall think proper from time to time by rule to
prescribe to any circuit or district court... ." 173
The question was whether that delegation was constitutional. 174 The
Supreme Court upheld the statute because Congress "delegated only 'a power
to vary minor regulations, which are within the great outlines marked out by
the legislature in directing the execution.' The delegation, in other words,
was limited to matters 'of less interest.' The 'important subjects' had been
resolved by Congress itself" 175 In other words, the delegation was
constitutional only because it was not "strictly and exclusively
legislative."' 176
17 0 E.g., CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1996).
171 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (emphasis added).
172 See Lemos, supra note 28, at 413.
173 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275,
276 (1792)).
174 See Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42 ("The counsel for the defendants
contend, that this clause, if extended beyond the mere regulation of practice in the Court,
would be a delegation of legislative authority which Congress can never be supposed to
intend, and has not the power to make.").
175 Lemos, supra note 28, at 414 (emphasis added) (quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) at 45).
176 Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42-43.
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3. Why Courts Are Reluctant to Enforce the Nondelegation Doctrine
Despite the important constitutional values served by the nondelegation
doctrine, the Supreme Court has only expressly struck down two statutes as
unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds-"both in 1935, one of which
'provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion [(Panama
Refining)], and the other of which [(Schechter Poultry)] conferred authority
to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard
than stimulating the economy by assuring "fair competition ..... 177 But those
two cases are telling because they reveal what role the nondelegation
doctrine plays in constitutional adjudication. Under Supreme Court
precedent-precedent, of course, which has never been overruled-a
delegation can be unconstitutional if (1) there is no intelligible principle at all
(a Panama Refining problem) 178 or (2) the delegation has an extraordinarily
enormous economic effect and an ill-defined intelligible principle (a
Schechter Poultry problem). 179
Importantly, there is a sliding scale: the more important the decision, the
more congressional guidance is required.180 This suggests that lesser policy
choices can be delegated more liberally than important choices-though such
a test risks circularity. As Professor Gary Lawson has joked, "the core of the
Constitution's nondelegation principle can be expressed as follows: Congress
must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the
statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." 181 But
177 Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at 55 (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.
L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935))).
178 See Pan. Ref, 293 U.S. at 429-30; J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle .... such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
179 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 548-50.
180 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475 ("[T]he degree of agency discretion that is
acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.").
Indeed, Justice Thomas is explicit that a delegation can be unconstitutional even if there
is an intelligible principle: "I am not convinced that the intelligible principle doctrine
serves to prevent all cessions of legislative power. [Instead,] there are cases in which the
principle is intelligible and yet the significance of the delegated decision is simply too
great for the decision to be called anything other than 'legislative."' Id. at 487 (Thomas,
J., concurring); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 486 (1998) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("[Schechter Poultry] involved a delegation through the National Industrial
Recovery Act that contained not simply a broad standard ('fair competition'), but also the
conferral of power on private parties to promulgate rules applying that standard to
virtually all of American industry." (citation omitted)).
181 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv.
1231, 1239 (1994).
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"[a]lthough this circular formulation may seem farcical, it recognizes that a
statute's required degree of specificity depends on context. . .. 3182
At the same time, the Supreme Court has not enforced the nondelegation
doctrine in many seemingly appropriate situations. As explained in 2001's
American Trucking decision, the Court has upheld
a statute giving an "agency power to fix the prices of commodities at a level
that 'will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the ... purposes
of th[e] Act,"' statutes "authorizing regulation in the 'public interest,"' and
a statute granting the "Securities and Exchange Commission authority to
modify the structure of holding company systems so as to ensure that they
are not 'unduly or unnecessarily complicate[d]' and do not 'unfairly or
inequitably distribute voting power among security holders."' 183
Though these may seem like "easy kills" under the nondelegation doctrine,
the Supreme Court still stayed its hand.184
There is reason for this judicial timidity-even though sometimes it may
be laid on a bit thick.185 Courts do not enforce the nondelegation doctrine
with more zeal because no administrable test has been devised to separate the
lawful from the unlawful. As Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court,
has explained, "'[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking,
inheres in most executive or judicial action."' 186 (Note that Justice Scalia
included the Judiciary in that statement.) Hence, the Supreme Court has
"'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law."' 187 Instead, "[t]he constitutional question-the distinction
between permissible 'assistance' and impermissible 'legislation'-is one of
182 Id. (footnote omitted).
183 See Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at 55-56 (alterations in original) (quoting
Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474).
184 Lawson, supra note 181, at 1240.
185 See, e.g., Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthome, 525 F.3d 23, 34 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Brown, J., dissenting in part) ("Like other courts that have rejected nondelegation
challenges to [this statute], the majority nominally performs a nondelegation analysis but
actually strips the doctrine of any meaning. It conjures standards and limits from thin air
to construct a supposed intelligible principle for the ... delegation. Although I agree the
nondelegation principle is extremely accommodating, the majority's willingness to
imagine bounds on delegated authority goes so far as to render the principle nugatory."
(citations omitted)).
186 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475 (alteration in original) (quoting Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
187 Id. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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degree." 188 And courts are naturally loathe to get involved when the question
is merely "one of degree" and not kind.
In fact, Chief Justice Marshall himself explained why enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine is so difficult. In Wayman v. Southard, after setting
forth the rule that Congress cannot "delegate to the Courts, or to any other
tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative," 189 Marshall
went on to note in the very next sentence:
But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature
may rightfully exercise itself. Without going farther for examples, we will
take that, the legality of which the counsel for the defendants admit. The
17th section of the Judiciary Act, and the 7th section of the additional act,
empower the Courts respectively to regulate their practice. It certainly will
not be contended, that this might not be done by Congress. The Courts, for
example, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the
filing of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same
description. It will not be contended, that these things might not be done by
the legislature, without the intervention of the Courts; yet it is not alleged
that the power may not be conferred on the judicial department.
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power
given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the
details. 190
Chief Justice Marshall put his finger on what has ever been-and ever
will be-the great weakness of the nondelegation doctrine: the line between
permissible delegation and constitutional abdication is often impossible to
draw. Thus, outside of extraordinary circumstances, the Judiciary will not
invalidate a statute on nondelegation grounds.
4. Enforcing Nondelegation Values Through Statutory Construction
Even though they are not easily policed, however, the Court "has not
surrendered the principles that underlie the nondelegation doctrine. Instead,
the doctrine 'has been relocated rather than abandoned."' 191 To protect
nondelegation values without directly enforcing the nondelegation doctrine,
federal courts regularly
188 Lemos, supra note 28, at 417-18.
189 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
19 0 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
191 Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at 57 (quoting Sunstein, supra note 5, at 315-
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interpret broadly phrased statutes more narrowly than their text suggests,
thus avoiding nondelegation concerns. Indeed, the Court itself has stated,
"In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally
has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that
otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional."'192
The Benzene Case is a famous example of this practice, but there are
others. 193
In the Benzene Case, Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality, confronted a
statute which required the Secretary of Labor to 'promulgat[e] standards
dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents,"' and which said that
the Secretary must "'set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee
will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard ... for the period of his
working life,' ' ' 194 In a bit of creative interpretation, the Court's plurality
found that, notwithstanding this expansive language, the Secretary
nonetheless must "find, as a threshold matter, that the [toxin] poses a
significant health risk in the workplace and that a new, lower standard is
therefore 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment and places of employment."1 95
Importantly, the plurality reasoned that without "a clear mandate in the
Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary
the unprecedented power over American industry,"' 196 and explained that "the
statute would make such a sweeping delegation of legislative power that it
might be unconstitutional under" principles of nondelegation if it were read
as broadly as the text suggested. 197 In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist
contended that directly enforcing the nondelegation doctrine is better than
192 Id. at 57-58 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7).
193 See, e.g., id. at 60-63 (discussing the "elephants in mouseholes" line of cases);
see also Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 682
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("In prior cases this Court has looked to sources other
than the legislative history to breathe life into otherwise vague delegations of legislative
power." (citing Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946))).
194 Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 612 (plurality opinion) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (1976)).
195 Id. at 614-15 (plurality opinion) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976)).
196 Id. at 645 (plurality opinion).
197 Id. at 646 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 72:2
ERIE AS NONDELEGA TION
indirectly narrowing a delegation's scope through statutory interpretation.198
The rest of the Court, however, declined to follow his lead.
In light of cases like the Benzene Case, Professor Cass Sunstein has
observed that "the nondelegation doctrine has not been interred," but instead
is found in "'a set of nondelegation canons, which forbid executive agencies
from making certain decisions on their own. "' 199 If an open-ended delegation
of authority can be read narrowly, then even if the interpretation is not the
most natural one, a court will still take that option to effectuate nondelegation
values without actually invalidating the statute. 200 -,In this way, the
nondelegation cannons [can be] understood as a species of judicial
minimalism, indeed democracy-forcing minimalism .... "'201 While these
nondelegation canons can lead to doctrinal incoherence because courts are
unable to apply them in a consistent manner,20 2 it nonetheless is a common
move in administrative law cases for courts to read broad delegations
narrowly to avoid nondelegation concerns.
B. Reading Erie as a Nondelegation Case
The nondelegation doctrine explains Erie well.20 3 Consider the realities
of Swift. Under Swift's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, a huge
swath of American law-much of it commercial law and so vital to the
national economy-was governed by rules announced by unelected federal
judges. These judge-made rules, moreover, were guided by no intelligible
principle set by Congress. The text of the Rules of Decision Act does not
198 See id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("I would also suggest that the widely
varying positions advanced in the briefs of the parties and in the opinions of MR. JUSTICE
STEVENS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL
demonstrate, perhaps better than any other fact, that Congress, the governmental body
best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this litigation, has
improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively, to this
Court.").
199 Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at 58-59 (quoting Sunstein, supra note 5, at
315).
200 See, e.g., id at 30-35, 46, 52 (discussing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
201 Id. at 59 (alterations in original) (quoting Sunstein, supra note 5, at 335).
202 See id. at 65 ("Indeed, problems of judicial administration similar to those that
plague the nondelegation doctrine also afflict its more evanescent proxy, as there is no
consistent way to determine when the doctrine should apply.").
203 Though some commentators have briefly alluded to Erie in the nondelegation
context, no one has systematically examined such a claim. See, e.g., Robert P. Wasson,
Jr., Resolving Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems Raised by Erie, the Rules
of Decision Act, and the Rules Enabling Act. A Proposed Solution, 32 CAP. U. L. REV.
519, 576-77 (2004).
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speak to law creation (that power was inferred in Swift), and so says nothing
about what principle should guide law creation. Swift thus represented
unbridled judicial control over a great deal of the national economy.
That particular combination of expansive power over the national
economy mixed with a statute lacking an intelligible principle is a recipe for
aggressive enforcement of the nondelegation principle, as is demonstrated by
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining. Accordingly, because of the
nondelegation doctrine, it simply is not true that "[w]here Congress speaks,
Erie has nothing more to say." 204 When important policy issues are
implicated, there are certain things that Congress cannot say to another
branch of government, be it the Executive or the Judiciary-like, "You do
it."
1. Reading Erie as a Nondelegation Case Makes Sense at a "Micro"
Level
The nondelegation doctrine fits the particular facts of Erie better than
any other constitutional basis, so reading Erie as a nondelegation decision
makes sense at a "micro" level.20 5 Pretend that the facts in Erie were just a
little different: instead of federal courts creating rules of decision in diversity
cases in which no state statute was on point, it was an executive agency
creating those rules. And just to make the hypothetical cleaner, imagine
further that Congress added a "Commerce Clause hook" allowing the
executive agency to create such rules only insofar as it is within Congress's
Commerce Clause power. (Of course, in Erie there was no "Commerce
Clause hook," but as explained above, Erie itself was within Congress's
Commerce Clause power.)20 6 Congress can give the Executive Branch power
to create substantive law in some instances. But if Congress were to attempt
to give the Executive Branch authority to make rules for all federal diversity
cases for which no state statute is on point, such an expansive delegation of
power would present grave nondelegation concerns. Those concerns would
be more serious still if Congress were to give the Executive Branch that
much authority with no intelligible principle to guide any ensuing law
creation. When such an extraordinary delegation is at issue, should it matter
that the delegate is an Article III court and not an Article II agency?
204 Green, supra note 11, at 642.
205 To be clear, when using the term "micro," this Article refers to whether a
particular constitutional argument explains Erie's conclusion vis-a-vis Erie's specific
facts and language. When using the term "macro," this Article refers to whether a
particular constitutional argument explains Erie's role in the broader context of the law.
206 See supra Part II.C.2.
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We know from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Wayman v. Southard
that the nondelegation doctrine can apply to the Judiciary, for "[i]t will not
be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other
tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." 207 We also
know that the nondelegation doctrine will condemn delegations which
"provide[] literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion" or "which
confer[] authority to regulate the entire economy" without clear guidance.208
Further, with the exception of two justices, the Erie Court in 1938 was the
same as the Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining Court of 1935.209 In
other words, the Erie Court was composed of essentially the same members
as the only Court in history that has actually struck down an act of Congress
on nondelegation grounds-and, in fact, which did it twice. Overruling
Swift's interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act in Erie may have been
aggressive, but was it any more aggressive than what the Supreme Court did
in Schechter Poultry?
There are additional reasons why reading Erie as nondelegation makes
sense at a "micro" level. While other potential constitutional grounds like
equal protection, legal positivism, or federalism are misguided,
nondelegation does not suffer from their flaws. Unlike the Equal Protection
Clause, the nondelegation doctrine had already been held to apply to the
federal government when Erie was decided. And unlike legal positivism, the
nondelegation doctrine was a standalone reason to overrule Swift. Finally,
unlike Judge Friendly's enumerated powers argument, the nondelegation
doctrine could apply even if the subject matter of a statute is within
Congress's enumerated powers-for instance, tort liability for accidents
involving interstate trains. Thus, unlike these other possible constitutional
justifications for Erie, the nondelegation doctrine explains the holding in Erie
given the actual facts in Erie and the state of the law when Erie was decided.
Moreover, if Erie is understood as a nondelegation case like Schechter
Poultry and Panama Refining, then the Erie Court's ruminations on the
nature of common law also make a great deal of sense. After all, if common
law is made, not found, then the implicit delegation recognized in Swift
suddenly becomes much more open-ended, and so no longer "benign."210 If
common law adjudication is a mechanical process with only one answer
207 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
208 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing Pan. Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935)).
209 Justices Willis Van Devanter and George Sutherland were replaced by Justices
Hugo Black and Stanley F. Reed.
210 Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1794 (1997).
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which every court will end up reaching anyway, then the delegation of
authority in the Rules of Decision Act (assuming that there was one) would
not have been that expansive-avoiding the Schechter Poultry problem.
There also, of course, would have been an intelligible principle--"find the
platonic common law"-which would have solved the Panama Refining
problem. But if it is impossible to "find" the "platonic common law" because
there is no "platonic common law" to find, then suddenly it becomes
apparent that federal courts under Swift were making their own law without
any congressional guidance. Thus it is wrong to say that "Erie's holding has
nothing to do with jurisprudential conceptions of law." 211 Instead, "the
Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act make the truth of [the nature of
common law adjudication] relevant to the allocation of power in the federal
system."212
To be sure, if Erie is understood as a nondelegation case, then legal
positivism is not the source of the constitutional problem posed by Swift.
That source would be the nondelegation doctrine. But a more complete
understanding of what the common law actually entails vis-d-vis the power
of judges would be pertinent to applying the nondelegation doctrine in the
judicial context. Given legal positivism, the delegation inferred from the
Rules of Decision Act in Swift was much more expansive than federal courts
may have initially believed, 213 and so nondelegation doctrine concerns arose.
Ironically, Professor Green himself stumbles into this nondelegation
argument. In his follow-up article responding to Professor Clark's
Supremacy Clause claim, Professor Green states:
Imagine, for example, that Congress enacted federal diversity jurisdiction
with the explicit purpose that federal courts should encourage interstate
commerce and avoid the misguided, biased rulings of state courts. In
administrative parlance, the latter would certainly constitute an "intelligible
principle" for non-delegation purposes. Now imagine that federal courts
used this hypothetical jurisdiction to create supreme federal common law.
(This would be Swift v. Tyson with preemptive teeth.) Under such
circumstances, Clark would surely object on Supremacy Clause grounds,
211 Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 91, at 709 (emphasis added).
212 Id. at 711.
213 See, e.g., id. at 711-12 ("There are doubtlessly readings offederal and state law
that would make the truth of legal realism "-or positivism- "relevant to the allocation of
lawmaking power in our federal system. Whether state and federal law now does so is a
matter of contested interpretation. But even if state and federal law make legal realism [or
positivism] relevant in this way, it is the law of a particular legal system that is doing the
justificatory work, not the truth of legal realism"-or positivism. (emphasis added)).
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and Congress's vague "intelligible principle" would be no help at all [for a
Supremacy Clause argument]. 214
With this brief discussion, offered in passing, Professor Green gives up
the game. In the Rules of Decision Act, Congress did not include an "explicit
purpose that federal courts should encourage interstate commerce and avoid
the misguided, biased rulings of state courts" by creating federal common
law to effectuate that purpose. 215 Hence, at a minimum, Swift's interpretation
of the statute failed under Panama Refining. Moreover, it is extremely
doubtful whether such a vague "intelligible principle," even if it actually
were included in the statute, would be permissible under the nondelegation
doctrine. As the Supreme Court has made clear, "the degree of agency
discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power
congressionally conferred. ' 216 This is the point of Schechter Poultry: There
are some delegations that Congress simply cannot make, even if a "vague
'intelligible principle' 217 is included.
2. Reading Erie as a Nondelegation Case Makes Sense at a "Macro"
Level
Reading Erie as nondelegation also makes sense at a "macro" level. A
perennial problem for federal courts scholars is understanding the nature of
federal common law, and Erie's role in it. If Erie is understood as forbidding
federal common law altogether as a matter of separation of powers, then Erie
is irreconcilable with what federal courts have long done218-and, indeed,
what the Erie Court itself did. 219 Federal courts make a lot of federal
common law, in a lot of different contexts. 220 Reading Erie as a
214 Green, supra note 121, at 677 (footnote omitted).
215 Id.
216 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
217 Green, supra note 11, at 677.
218 See, e.g., id at 632 ("[T]he Framing generation thought that federal courts held
extremely robust common-law powers." (citing Alton B. Parker, The Common Law
Jurisdiction of the United States Courts, 17 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1907))); see also Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 50 (1825) (upholding federal courts' common-law
power to establish their own procedures, which power was delegated by Congress in the
earliest days of the Republic).
219 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 620 ("On the same day Erie was decided, for
example, the Court applied federal common law to an interstate border dispute, and
Brandeis wrote both majority opinions." (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938))).
220 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008) (expressly
creating rule for punitive damages in the admiralty context as a matter of federal common
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nondelegation decision minimizes this doctrinal tension. Just as executive
officers are not constantly looking over their shoulders due to fear of the
nondelegation doctrine whenever they execute the law, 221 federal judges
need not worry about nondelegation concerns too much-at least not most of
the time.
But for both branches, the nondelegation doctrine has a role in
extraordinary circumstances. At some point, a delegation can be simply too
much. When that happens, it must be struck down under Schechter Poultry
and Panama Refining, and, indeed, under Erie. In other words, reading Erie
as a nondelegation decision preserves a substantial role for federal common
law, but not a limitless role.
This is not to say that the nondelegation doctrine should operate
identically in both contexts. In fact, there are good reasons to think that
federal courts should be more aggressive in policing the nondelegation line
when they are Congress's chosen delegate. First, the separation of powers
problems are lessened; there is an intuitive difference between a federal court
saying that Congress cannot give power to the President and a federal court
saying Congress cannot give power to a federal court. A court's declining
power for itself is surely different than a court declining power on behalf of
someone else. And second, there are more institutional checks which
minimize nondelegation concerns when the Executive is exercising delegated
power: "[Mlodern administrative law critically relies on ex post
mechanisms-checks on the exercise of delegated authority that operate after
the initial grant-to legitimate delegation of lawmaking authority outside of
Congress." 222 Agencies, for instance, "are accountable to Congress through
oversight hearings, budgetary dependence, and Senate confirmation of
agency officials," and "judicial review [helps assure] conformity [with] the
agency's statutory mandate." 223 This is not true for federal courts. For these
reasons, an "extraordinary circumstances" test might be an easier standard to
meet in the judicial context.
Reading Erie as a nondelegation decision also avoids another "macro"
problem. Professor Green argues that Erie should not be extended beyond the
diversity context, and that the Supreme Court's invocation of Erie outside of
that context is a doctrinal blunder.224 Not so. If Erie is a nondelegation case,
law); United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 2008) (expressly deciding the
scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a question of federal common law).
221 See, e.g., Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474-75 ("[W]e have 'almost never felt
qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment
that can be left to those executing or applying the law."' (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
222 Young, supra note 110, at 1668.
223 Id. at 1667.
224 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 614.
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then it can and should apply in many contexts. The common denominator for
striking down a delegation under the nondelegation doctrine is not what type
of case is before the court (nor what branch of government is the delegate),
but instead is how much authority Congress has given away. Understanding
Erie as nondelegation thus avoids reading Erie so narrowly that the Court's
reliance on it in nondiversity cases like Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain225 was
error. It is not error to extend Erie because Erie is bigger than just diversity
jurisdiction. 226
The upshot of this is that most federal common law is not
unconstitutional, but that Erie still has a role to play in nondiversity contexts.
Thus, if Congress wants to authorize the specific result reached in Swift,
Congress can do so by specifically giving federal courts authority to create
efficient rules for commercial paper disputes brought in federal court under
the diversity statute. That would be a narrow delegation with an intelligible
principle. Or, indeed, Congress could specifically authorize the federal courts
to craft rules of tort liability for interstate trains, either as a matter of
diversity jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction, provided that Congress
includes clear directions as to what purpose the federal rules are to
accomplish. That too would be a narrow delegation with an intelligible
principle. But what Congress cannot do is delegate power to create law in
nearly every diversity case with no intelligible principle at all. While this
line-drawing is not easy and so should not be treated lightly, in an
extraordinary situation (like in Schechter Poultry, Panama Refining, and
Erie) a delegation can simply go too far.
Finally, the most important "macro" reason for reading Erie as a
nondelegation case is that it gives teeth to the constitutional structure. For
reasons explained above, the nondelegation doctrine is more than empty
formalism (though formalism by itself is enough). It is also functional-and
tremendously important. Congress alone should exercise legislative powers
because Congress alone is built to do so. And just as significantly, Congress
alone should exercise legislative powers because Congress is institutionally
225 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
226 Indeed, Professor Green himself identifies this point, but fails to appreciate its
significance. He expressly notes that Swift may have been unconstitutional because it
"allow[ed] federal judges to make law with too much discretion and too little
congressional guidance." Green, supra note 11, at 618. He seemingly did not realize,
however, that he was using language that reflects nondelegation principles. Instead, he
jumped to the conclusion that if a separation of powers argument is accepted, then "most
forms of federal common law [are] unconstitutional." Id. Under the nondelegation
doctrine, however (which is a separation of powers doctrine), it is not true that "most"
federal common law is unconstitutional. As with the Executive Branch, it is only
extraordinary delegations of power to the Judicial Branch that raise constitutional
concerns.
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designed to protect against the misuse of those legislative powers.
Accordingly, federal lawmaking-at least at the broad level of animating
policy-should occur in the halls of Congress. If Congress wants a code of
commercial law to govern the United States, then Congress must make it,
subject to the full gamut of procedures set out in Article I. It cannot hand off
that undertaking to another branch of government, be it the Executive or the
Judicial Branch. This basic principle is the core of the nondelegation
doctrine, and Erie effectuates that core.
3. Did the Supreme Court Intend to Issue a Nondelegation Decision in
Erie?
This discussion, however, prompts an important point. Even though it
makes a great deal of doctrinal sense to understand Erie in nondelegation
terms, one must ask whether the Erie Court actually intended it to be a
nondelegation case. In other words, did the Erie Court deliberately (but
opaquely) issue a nondelegation decision, or did the Court reach the right
result but for the wrong reasons? Based on language used in Erie's majority
opinion and Justice Reed's concurrence, there is a plausible argument that
Erie was intended to reflect nondelegation principles. But even if Erie was
not written as a nondelegation decision, it should be understood as one going
forward because the nondelegation doctrine offers the best account for Erie's
constitutional holding and for Erie's application in cases outside of the
diversity context.
The opinions in Erie contain a number of statements which suggest that
nondelegation principles may have been on the Supreme Court's mind. The
Erie majority held that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State." 227 This sentence deserves particular attention because it is
the first sentence in the Court's constitutional reasoning. 228 "Govern," of
course, means "to control a point in issue." 229 Thus, Swift was
unconstitutional because federal law was being made that was not controlled
by Congress. Such federal law was invalid, so state law applied. This
analysis is consistent with the nondelegation doctrine. The purpose of the
intelligible principle requirement is to ensure that it is Congress, the
policymaking branch, which "governs" the creation of federal law. 230
Without such an intelligible principle, a federal statute cannot stand.
227 Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompson, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
228 See id.
229 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 764 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
230 E.g., United States v. Bozarov, 974 F.2d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Congress
may therefore delegate under broad general directives so long as it 'clearly delineates
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Likewise, as explained above, Erie's constitutional analysis relies
heavily on legal positivism. That also is a strong hint that nondelegation
principles were at work. When the Supreme Court accepted that federal
courts under the Swift regime were making and not merely finding law, then
the delegation of authority under the Rules of Decision Act suddenly became
much more expansive (or rather the expansiveness that had always been there
was now in the open). The Court was concerned-palpably so. But the Court
did not articulate well why it was concerned. The Court's underlying
concern, however, can be explained quite naturally by the nondelegation
doctrine: Federal courts cannot make such broad policy announcements
without clear congressional guidance. Accordingly, the Erie Court held that
"federal courts [lack] the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of
common law are," and that "in the federal courts the parties are [not] entitled
to an independentjudgment on matters of general law."231
Moreover, in his concurrence (which relied on statutory grounds alone),
Justice Reed wrote:
The "unconstitutional" course referred to in the majority opinion is
apparently the ruling in Swift v. Tyson that the supposed omission of
Congress to legislate as to the effect of decisions leaves federal courts free
to interpret general law for themselves.... If the [majority] opinion
commits this Court to the position that the Congress is without power to
declare what rules of substantive law shall govern the federal courts, that
conclusion also seems questionable. The line between procedural and
substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure.
Wayman v. Southard, [23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1]. The Judiciary Article [III]
and the "necessary and proper" clause of Article One may fully authorize
legislation, such as this section of the Judiciary Act.232
Justice Reed's concurrence is not especially pellucid. But this paragraph
can be understood to mean that he understood the majority opinion to say
that because Congress did not direct the federal courts in the creation of
general law, it was unconstitutional for them to do so. It is but a short throw
from that conclusion to the nondelegation doctrine. Likewise, the invocation
of the line between substance and procedure, read in conjunction with the
cite to Wayman v. Southard, can be viewed as an attempt to limit Erie's
nondelegation holding to substantive, and not procedural, law. That is a line
[the] general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this
delegated authority.' (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946))).
231 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(finding the fallacy in Swift to be the assumption that federal courts have the power to
create general common law).
232 Id. at 91-92 (Reed, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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that Chief Justice Marshall arguably drew in Wayman when he held that
Congress can delegate power over narrow procedural issues to the federal
courts (as a "less[er]" matter), but expressly stated that delegations of
substantive lawmaking power might be different.233 Justice Reed may have
been trying to preserve that categorical distinction.
Importantly, however, even if the Erie Court did not set out to write a
nondelegation opinion, it nonetheless is both permissible and sensible to
understand Erie in nondelegation terms. Indeed, even if the Court based its
decision on another constitutional ground altogether, it is appropriate to
understand Erie as a nondelegation case, because 'when the ratio decidendi
of a previous case is obscure, out of accord with authority or established
principle, or too broadly expressed,"' stare decisis only requires that the
judgment be respected. 234 The Erie Court's constitutional reasoning was
sparse and ill-defined-seemingly sounding more in intuition than rigorous
analysis.235 It thus is appropriate to assess whether the Court's decision has a
constitutional basis, and then follow that basis. The nondelegation doctrine
provides just such a constitutional basis.
4. Possible Objections to Reading Erie as a Nondelegation Decision
Professor Green raises a number of arguments why separation of powers
analysis should not apply to Erie. For instance, he argues that a workable
separation of powers argument "must differentiate common law from other
forms of judicial activity, which is not easy." 236 True enough, though this
argument surely proves too much. 237
233 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
234 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting RUPERT CROSS &
J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 100-41 (4th ed. 1991)).
235 Needless to say, if the Supreme Court itself did not know the precise
constitutional mooring of Erie when it decided the case on constitutional grounds, then
that does not reflect well on the Erie Court. The Constitution must not be used for
atmospherics.
236 Green, supra note 11, at 619; see also Green, supra note 121, at 678 ("The
question of what counts as agency 'lawmaking' tracks the foregoing discussion of what
constitutes 'common law.' Where does lawmaking start and stop?" (footnote omitted)).
237 See Clark, supra note 121, at 710 ("Courts and commentators self-consciously
define federal common law in opposition to interpretation in order to distinguish between
two conceptually distinct kinds of judicial activity. This distinction is necessary to uphold
the widely-shared assumption that a Constitution that establishes a republican form of
government and elaborate lawmaking procedures would not give unelected, life-tenured
judges unchecked power to make federal law at will. To be sure, the line between
interpretation and lawmaking is often difficult to draw .... Federal courts, however,
have never considered themselves incapable of basing their own decisions on
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And, in any event, this critique's edge is dulled if Erie is viewed as a
nondelegation case. Under longstanding precedent, in most instances it will
not be necessary to spend a great deal of time distinguishing between
constitutional and unconstitutional delegation. Most delegations, after all, are
constitutional. It is only in a case involving an extraordinary delegation-like
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining-where serious line-drawing is
necessary. Moreover, line-drawing is arguably even less troublesome when
courts and not agencies are Congress's chosen delegate, because "the sorts of
broad and open-ended delegations that might trigger application of the
nondelegation doctrine are relatively rare in the judicial context, far more
rare than equivalent delegations to agencies." 238
Professor Green's critique does present a deeper issue, however. Courts
and commentators alike have not carefully explained what exactly they mean
by "federal common law," particularly in application. 239 When looking at
"federal common law" through a nondelegation lens, we must be careful not
to confuse the antecedent question of whether Congress has delegated
authority in the first place with the question of whether a particular
delegation is constitutional. After all, just because it may be constitutional for
Congress to delegate to a court the power to create an evidentiary privilege
(assuming, of course, that the delegation is not too expansive),240 it does not
follow that Congress has delegated the power to create such a privilege under
a particular statute. The same is true for causes of action and defenses. 241 A
court still must decide what Congress intended a statute to mean, and there
are often right, or at least better, answers to such questions. 242
interpretation of positive federal law rather than on open-ended judicial lawmaking."
(footnotes omitted)).
238 Lemos, supra note 28, at 444.
239 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 619 (explaining that "[n]o court or scholar has
fully resolved" what exactly is meant by common law).
240 Cf FED. R. EVID. 501 ("[T]he privilege of a witness, person, government, State,
or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.").
241 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 620 (suggesting that if courts read Erie as a
separation of powers case, "[j]urists who disfavor private litigation might decry common-
law causes of action but not common-law defenses, while plaintiff-friendly advocates
might prefer the opposite").
242 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Fred Bernstein, Clerkship Politics, 2 GREEN BAG (2d)
57, 59-60 (1998) ("[i]f [a liberal clerk] and [a conservative federal judge] listed 10
possible arguments in a case, and ranked them from strongest to weakest, [the] rankings
would be pretty much the same. I think it's [a judge's] job to pick 1, 2 or 3, even if [he
doesn't] like the outcome in 1, 2 or 3. [He] can't skip over them to pick number 9 to get
the result [he] like[s]."). Of course, a judge should pick the best reading of the statute,
and not the second or third best reading.
20111
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Accordingly, it is untrue that any ambiguity in a statute is itself a
delegation to a court to decide on its own what the best answer is, according
to the court's own judgment. A court needs some special authorization from
Congress to assume that policymaking power.243 And if a judge intentionally
decides contrary to what Congress has directed under the best reading of a
statute, the judge is not somehow creating "federal common law." The judge
is just being a bad judge-an unfaithful steward. 244 Indeed, if delegated
authority to make common law can be unconstitutional because of
nondelegation principles, then "federal common law" that is created outside
of any plausible delegation from Congress is surely more constitutionally
problematic still. 24
5
243 To be sure, almost every judicial interpretation of a statute can be considered, in
some sense, to be common law-making. After all, a judicial opinion might make clear
that "X" is covered by a statute, even though the statute does not specifically mention
"X" (otherwise, presumably, there would not have been a court case over the issue in the
first place). Giving concrete meaning to abstract statutory language may be seen as a
form of common law adjudication. So be it. But that does not undermine this Article's
central claim that in extraordinary cases a delegation can be too much. In other words, of
course the line-drawing is hard, which means courts ought to be reticent in doing it, but
that does not mean that there is no role for courts at all. Moreover, nondelegation
concerns arguably play a role in how a statute ought to be interpreted in the first place.
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
673, 673 (1997) (arguing that textualism best represents nondelegation principles).
244 Related to this point, Professor Green puts weight on statutory canons, arguing
that they are judicial creations akin to common law. See Green, supra note 11, at 629. He
is right-to a point. If as a canon of construction reflects reasonable assumptions about
what Congress intended, then they are not necessarily conceptually objectionable, nor do
they represent the exercise of delegated authority. "But it is a different question
altogether whether a court can modify an otherwise-standard reading of a statute in its
pursuit of something else. As put by Justice Scalia, 'Can we really just decree that we
will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean less or more than what they fairly
say?"' Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at 64 (quoting Scalia, supra note 138, at 29). In
other words, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is objectionable to create canons of
construction which effectuate values apart from those chosen by Congress.
245 Federal common law, of course, is a broad concept. This Article does not explore
all its wrinkles. It is enough for purposes here to note that when courts act beyond or
outside congressional directive, then constitutional problems arise. See Young, supra
note 110, at 1642-43 ("Federal common law comes in a number of different forms.
Sometimes Congress expressly delegates common lawmaking authority to federal courts
.... Sometimes the delegation is implicit .... It is just a step beyond this idea of explicit
or implicit delegation to say that when Congress leaves gaps in federal statutes-when it
fails to specify a measure of damages for new federal claims, for example-it means for
the courts to fill in those gaps through federal common lawmaking.... In other areas,
federal common lawmaking seems to derive simply from the presence of strong federal
interests." (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1660 (criticizing "federal interest" cases because
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A related argument that Professor Green advances is that viewing Erie as
a separation of powers case does not explain federal enclaves and the like.246
That is a fair point. Erie does not answer why federal courts have power to
create common law in the admiralty and border dispute contexts, for
example, even in the absence of any congressional delegation. There are a
couple of ways to respond to this objection. First, we can simply side-step it.
Admiralty and border disputes are constitutional outliers for reasons
independent of Erie. As Judge Friendly forcefully argued, "if all the grants of
judicial power in Article III imply power in the federal courts to make
substantive law for their disposition, some rather famous cases may have
been wrongly decided. ''247 The driving principle of federal jurisdiction is that
a jurisdictional grant, as a general matter, ought not to be understood as a
delegation of lawmaking authority. 248 That history has taken a different path
in the context of admiralty and border disputes does not mean that diversity
jurisdiction must or should go down that path too, especially because
Congress affirmatively asserted its power over diversity in the Rules of
Decision Act, which was enacted in 1789.249
But second, there is a more profound counter-argument to this enclave
claim. Why assume that those enclaves are constitutionally permissible? To
be sure, the weight of history may be enough alone to justify federal
the policies decisions made by courts are "attributable to Congress only in some
extremely attenuated and abstract way").
246 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 620-21 ("The enclave of federal common law
governing interstate disputes is nearly universally accepted; admiralty is also highly
conventional. The analytical warrant for such exceptions is less clear. Nationalizing
interstate disputes and admiralty was a reason for establishing federal courts in the first
place. But that does not require federal courts to create substantive law rather than
demanding congressional guidance. After all, why should unelected judges, rather than
Congress, make law in areas of such vital national importance? And if judicial
lawmaking is permissible for interstate litigation and admiralty, why not in other
important categories of Article III jurisdiction, like diversity?" (footnotes omitted)).
247 Friendly, supra note 36, at 395 (emphasis added) (suggesting as examples:
United States v. Hudson, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816) and United States v. Coolidge,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)).
248 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 742 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The rule against finding a delegation of substantive lawmaking power in a
grant of jurisdiction is subject to exceptions, some better established than others. The
most firmly entrenched is admiralty law, derived from the grant of admiralty jurisdiction
in Article III, § 2, cl. 3, of the Constitution. In the exercise of that jurisdiction federal
courts develop and apply a body of general maritime law, 'the well-known and well-
developed venerable law of the sea which arose from the custom among seafaring men."'
(quoting R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 960 (4th Cir. 1999))).
249 Federal Judiciary Act, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
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enclaves. But to a "Martian," 250 it would seem odd that Courts are making
important policy decisions without congressional guidance in any context,
given that courts are not institutionally designed to create such systemic
rules. 251 Courts, after all, unlike Congress, have limited ability to
independently collect facts, and they are not designed to know and weigh the
competing interests of different sectors of the economy and Nation. Judicial
action also is not subject to the gamut of procedural requirements that are
built into Article I. Congress, on the other hand, can collect facts more
broadly than courts can and represents the entire Nation, and so is able to
evaluate interests in ways that courts cannot. Congress's ability to exercise
those powers, moreover, is also limited by structural constitutional restraints
that do not apply to the Judiciary. Though it is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is surely worth asking whether the federal Judiciary is the
constitutionally appropriate branch to ever create such expansive federal
common law-at least without clear instructions from Congress to guide
them.
IV. SOSA V. AL VAREZ-MACHAIN AS NONDELEGATION
If Erie is understood as a nondelegation case, then it also offers an
attractive explanation for the Supreme Court's much more recent holding in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.252 In particular, as demonstrated in the Benzene
Case, a common judicial move in cases involving delegation to the Executive
Branch is to read broad delegations of authority in a narrow fashion to
minimize nondelegation concerns. 253 While this practice is controversial and
the Supreme Court does not do it consistently due to its textually untethered
nature, 254 it is clear that the Court attempts to protect nondelegation values
through statutory interpretation. With that as the background, Sosa can be
understood as an example of that same "move," but in the context of a
delegation to the Judiciary. The Court found that the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)255 was an implicit delegation of authority to create causes of action,
but then read that implicit delegation much more narrowly than the plaintiff
250 Cf Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between
State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles ", 78 VA.
L. REv. 1769, 1770 (1992) (analyzing how law would look to an extraterrestrial visitor).
251 Cf Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982) (noting that Congress has
"superior institutional competence to pursue this debate").
252 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
253 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 26, at 244-46.
254 See Loshin & Nielson, supra note 142, at 45-48.
255 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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wished, for reasons that sound in the nondelegation doctrine. 256 This
application of a common nondelegation move in Sosa is significant because
Sosa is Professor Green's leading example of Erie being applied in contexts
where it does not belong. 257
Sosa is a factually more dreary case than Erie. A Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) agent "was captured on assignment in Mexico and
taken to a house in Guadalajara, where he was tortured over the course of a
2-day interrogation, then murdered. '258 The DEA believed that "Humberto
Alvarez-Machain ... , a Mexican physician, was present at the house and
acted to prolong the agent's life in order to extend the interrogation and
torture."' 259 After negotiations with Mexico failed, the "DEA approved a plan
to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United States
for trial."' 260 "[A] group of Mexicans, including ... Jose Francisco Sosa,
abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought
him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal
officers." 261 After various preliminary disputes (which themselves
independently ended up before the Supreme Court), 262 "[t]he case was tried
in 1992, and ended at the close of the Government's case, when the District
Court granted Alvarez's motion for a judgment of acquittal. 263
Back in Mexico, Alvarez sued "Sosa under the ATS, for a violation of
the law of nations." 264 The Alien Tort Statute, also enacted in 1789 as part of
the First Judiciary Act, provides in its entirety that "[t]he district courts shall
256 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 ("[For various reasons dealing with the institutional
role of the courts,] we are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms
familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.").
257 See Green, supra note 11, at 598 ("One example of Erie's overgrowth concerns
the judicial application of customary international law under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS). In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Erie was a touchstone of the Court's ATS analysis,
and not one Justice questioned Erie's relevance. What Sosa inadequately explained,
however, is why Erie, a 1938 decision about choice of law in diversity suits, should affect
the interpretation of a 1789 statute concerning torts based on international law."
(footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 643 ("Thus, if [advocates for the proposition that Erie
imposes constitutional limits on federal common law] would use Erie to overthrow the
ATS's original meaning, they need a constitutional hook for their separation-of-powers
narrative, and that constitutional basis seems quite hard to find.").
258 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 698.
261 Id.
262 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 656-58 (1992).
263 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
264 Id.
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have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States. ' 265 The lower courts agreed that the Alien Tort Statute supported
Alvarez's claims. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The
Court was unanimous that Sosa's argument could not proceed, but was split
on the reasoning.
Justice Souter wrote for the majority. Following upon Judge Friendly's
earlier characterization, Souter explained that the Alien Tort Statute is "a
'legal Lohengrin'; 'no one seems to know whence it came,' and for over 170
years after its enactment it provided jurisdiction in only one case." 266 The
majority concluded, however, that while the Alien Tort Statute speaks only
of jurisdiction, Congress did not intend it to be stillborn, for "torts in
violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the
common law of the time. '2 67 According to the majority, Congress implicitly
authorized the federal courts to recognize these causes of action.268
In particular, based on the scanty history of the Alien Tort Statute and its
own intuition, the Sosa Court reasoned:
[T]here is every reason to suppose that the First Congress did not pass the
ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a
future Congress or state legislature that might, someday, authorize the
creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element of the law
of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners. The anxieties of the
preconstitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to think that the
statute was not meant to have a practical effect. Consider that the principal
draftsman of the ATS was apparently Oliver Ellsworth, previously a
member of the Continental Congress that had passed the 1781 resolution
and a member of the Connecticut Legislature that made good on that
congressional request. Consider, too, that the First Congress was attentive
enough to the law of nations to recognize certain offenses expressly as
criminal .... It would have been passing strange for Ellsworth and this very
Congress to vest federal courts expressly with jurisdiction to entertain civil
causes brought by aliens alleging violations of the law of nations, but to no
effect whatever until the Congress should take further action. There is too
much in the historical record to believe that Congress would have enacted
the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely. 269
265 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
266 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 (citation omitted) (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)).
267 Id. at 714.
268 Id. at 720.
269 Id. at 719 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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This looked like a victory for the plaintiff. If the Alien Tort Statute
implicitly allows courts to create common law causes of action, then
presumably federal courts would be open to a case like Alvarez's. Justice
Souter, however, closed that door. 270 Even after acknowledging that the
Alien Tort Statute is more than just a jurisdictional grant, "[Justice] Souter
rejected the ... position that all customary international law is automatically
enforceable in federal court. '271 Instead, he stated that "courts should require
any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized"; 272 in other words, "violation of safe conducts, infringement of
ambassadors' rights, and piracy." 273
Justice Souter's reasoning for giving with one hand but taking with the
other deserves careful attention. The Sosa Court noted that in 1789, "the
common law appears to have ... assumed only a very limited set of
claims." 274 Moreover, citing Blackstone, the Court noted that in 1789,
"'offences against this law [of nations] [were] principally incident to whole
states or nations,' and not individuals seeking relief in court. 27
5
But what about the fact that the causes of action which the Court did
acknowledge under the Alien Tort Statute were not statutory, but instead
were common law in character? If Congress in 1789 implicitly authorized
federal courts to recognize causes of action using common law methods, why
is the holding in Sosa so limited? To answer that question, Justice Souter
turned to Erie. He first noted that "the prevailing conception of the common
law has changed since 1789 in a way that counsels restraint in judicially
applying internationally generated norms."276 After all, "[w]hen [the statute]
was enacted, the accepted conception was of the common law as 'a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute,"' but "[n]ow, however, in most
cases where a court is asked to state or formulate a common law principle in
270 See, e.g., Green, supra note 11, at 637-39 (explaining how Sosa's majority
opinion produced a "middle-ground result").
271 Id. at 636.
272 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
273 See Green, supra note 11, at 638.
274 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720.
275 Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIEs *68).
276 Id. at 725.
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a new context, there is a general understanding that the law is not so much
found or discovered as it is either made or created. 277
Moreover, "along with, and in part driven by, that conceptual
development in understanding common law has come an equally significant
rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it."'278 After Erie, there
is no 'general' common law," and while Congress has authorized some
areas of federal common law (such as the creation of "evidentiary privileges
in federal-question cases") or the Court has created "interstitial" law, "the
general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law. It would be remarkable to take a
more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that remained largely in
shadow for much of the prior two centuries." 279 Thus, "a decision to create a
private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great
majority of cases." 280
Likewise, "[w]hile the absence of congressional action addressing
private rights of action under an international norm is more equivocal than its
failure to provide such a right when it creates a statute, the possible collateral
consequences of making international rules privately actionable argue for
judicial caution." 281 "[M]odern international law" is more concerned with
"claim[s] [to] limit ... the power of foreign governments over their own
citizens[] and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed
those limits." 282 This means recognizing novel causes of action under the
Alien Tort Statute risks "impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and
Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs." 283 Finally, federal courts
"have no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional
understanding of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively
encouraged greater judicial creativity. 28 4
2 77 Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
278 Id. at 726.
2 79 Id. (citing, inter alia, FED. R. EvID. 501).
2 80 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 728. Justice Scalia would have gone further still. According to him, the
Alien Tort Statute must be understood as only a jurisdictional grant, and federal courts
cannot create common law causes for it-particularly after Erie. Scalia explained that
Erie changed everything:
Unlike the general common law that preceded it, however, federal common law
[today is] self-consciously "made" rather than "discovered," by judges who [seek] to
avoid falling under the sway of (in Holmes's hyperbolic language) "[t]he fallacy and
[Vol. 72:2
ERIE AS NONDELEGA TION
Professor Green criticizes the Sosa opinion for not explaining "why Erie
should merit a pivotal role in applying customary international law under the
ATS. Erie postdates the statute by almost one hundred fifty years, and
Brandeis's opinion does not reference customary international law, much less
the ATS."' 285 But nonetheless, "[a]lthough Tompkins's negligence action
obviously differed from Alvarez-Machain's human rights suit, [Sosa] views
both as somehow analogous forms of judicial lawmaking that deserve
uniform, categorical suspicion." 286 Moreover, Professor Green observes that:
The Sosa majority's "definition" and "acceptance" standards reveal an
internal tension. The urge to suppress ATS litigation stems from ...
resistance to federal common law. Yet courts must use distinctively
common-law methods to identify which tort actions the ATS allows. The
Court's "definiteness" and "acceptance" standards have no support in the
ATS's text or legislative history; such tests emerged from a canvass of
United States history and an evaluation of ATS litigation's "practical
consequences." Likewise, courts applying Sosa's doctrinal test will have
only judicial precedents as guideposts and will almost inevitably produce
flexible, case-by-case judgments. From a functional viewpoint, this looks
much like the unguided, common-law policymaking that [supposedly]
raises separation-of-powers concerns .... 287
illusion" that there exists "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute."
Id. at 741 (Scalia, J., concurring) (third alteration in original) (quoting Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Thus, post-Erie, "federal common law (in the sense of
judicially pronounced law) [is limited to] a 'few and restricted' areas in which 'a federal
rule of decision is necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, and those in which
Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law."' Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)). Accordingly, in this new post-Erie world, it cannot be that federal courts have
the power to simply create new causes of action for the Alien Tort Statute. See, e.g., id. at
741-42 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The general rule ... is that '[t]he vesting ofjurisdiction
in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal
common law.' This rule applies not only to applications of federal common law that
would displace a state rule, but also to applications that simply create a private cause of
action under a federal statute." (alteration in original)). Therefore, the Court should not
recognize any causes of action under it: "[C]ourts cannot possibly be thought to have
been given, and should not be thought to possess, federal-common-law-making powers
with regard to the creation of private federal causes of action for violations of customary
international law." Id. at 747 (Scalia, J., concurring). Because Justice Souter's majority
opinion is the law, this Article will focus on it.
285 Green, supra note 11, at 637-38.
286 Id. at 638.
2 871 d. at 638-39 (footnote omitted).
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Professor Green's objections are met, in large part, by the nondelegation
doctrine. For instance, it is wholly beside the point that "Erie postdates the
[Alien Tort Statute] by almost one hundred fifty years." 288 Erie is properly a
constitutional decision, given the nondelegation doctrine, and the
Constitution supersedes the Alien Tort Statute. And while it is true that
Justice Brandeis did not "reference customary international law, much less
the ATS,' 289 Erie's constitutional footing-the nondelegation doctrine-is
not limited to the diversity context. Likewise, both the Alien Tort Statute and
the Rules of Decision Act, which were both included in the Judiciary Act of
1789,290 can be interpreted as broad delegations to the courts. 291 If the Alien
Tort Statute was intended as such, then it is unsurprising that the Court
adopted a narrow construction of it to avoid nondelegation concerns. The
Court does that all the time in nondelegation cases. 292 Thus, the Alien Tort
Statute and the Rules of Decision Act are "analogous forms of judicial
lawmaking that deserve uniform, categorical suspicion." 293
Professor Green is right, however, to recognize the "tension" in Justice
Souter's approach-which is one point to favor Justice Scalia's bright-line
rule.294 But after rejecting Scalia's approach, the Sosa Court felt that it
needed to find some way to limit the scope of the delegation. After all, if the
Alien Tort Statute is conceptualized as an implicit delegation of authority to
federal courts to create common law causes of action for unspecified
customary international law disputes, then it poses profound nondelegation
concerns-the most obvious being that under this conception of the Alien
Tort Statute, there is no intelligible principle to guide the federal courts. That
is problematic under Panama Refining, which requires an "intelligible
principle" in the statute itself.295
Justice Souter's majority opinion hints at this Panama Refining problem.
He explained first that "the general practice has been to look for legislative
288 Id. at 638.
289 Id.
290 Federal Judiciary Act, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789) (Alien Tort Statute); id. § 34, 1
Stat. at 92 (Rules of Decision Act).
291 To be clear, this Article takes the view that, as an initial matter, neither statute
should be read as a delegation because neither text makes such a delegation. The Swift
Court, however, read the Rules of Decision Act as an implicit delegation. Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842). Likewise, the Sosa majority also understood the Alien
Tort Statute to be an implicit delegation, but then read the delegation narrowly. Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). This Article assumes arguendo that the
Sosa majority was correct to find an implicit delegation.
292 See supra Part HI.A.4.
293 Green, supra note 11, at 638.
294 See supra note 284.
295 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935).
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guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law," and
second that "[w]e have no congressional mandate to seek out and define new
and debatable violations of the law of nations."296 Both of these statements
suggest that the Sosa Court was concerned that there was no intelligible
principle in the Alien Tort Statute. When faced with a statute that does not
present an intelligible principle, it is a common move in nondelegation cases
for the Court itself to rummage about for one. 297 The Sosa majority thus
found an intelligible principle in the Act's structure and history. Hence,
"courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized. '298
There are also shadows of Schechter Poultry in Sosa. Though the Alien
Tort Statute does not have the same sort of domestic economic effect as the
National Industrial Recovery Act did, the Alien Tort Statute nonetheless
involves exceptionally important policy considerations of a sort that courts
ought to avoid. As Justice Souter explained, the Alien Tort Statute, if read
expansively, may have "potential implications for the foreign relations of the
United States," and this "should make courts particularly wary of impinging
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs." 299 Indeed, courts have no place, at least without clear and
detailed instructions, "to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments
over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign government or its agent has
transgressed those limits." 300 Congress cannot delegate that sort of foreign
affairs power to the federal Judiciary without a much more explicit principle
that narrows the scope of the delegation.
296 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726, 728.
297 E.g., Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607,
682 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("in prior cases this Court has looked to sources
other than the legislative history to breathe life into otherwise vague delegations of
legislative power. In American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, for example, this Court
concluded that certain seemingly vague delegations 'derive[d] much meaningftl content
from the purpose of the Act, its factual background and the statutory context in which
they appear."' (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Am.
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946))); Manning, supra note 26, at 244-
46.
298 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
2 9 9 1d. at 727.
300 Id.
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V. ERIE AND THE SHERMAN ACT
As explained, Erie-properly understood-is precedent for the
proposition that the nondelegation doctrine applies to the Judicial Branch too.
The Supreme Court thus has rightly extended Erie beyond the diversity
jurisdiction context, such as in Sosa. But the Court perhaps has not gone far
enough; there may be other areas of law where Erie as a nondelegation
decision could be extended. In particular, the nondelegation doctrine
arguably should also be applied in the antitrust context. Scholars have
recognized the potential conceptual difficulty inherent in judicial
administration of the antitrust statutes, but they have not identified a
signature case where the nondelegation doctrine has been used to curtail the
exercise of such delegated power. Erie may be that signature case.
Like Swift, antitrust arguably represents another instance where
economic policy is left "in judicial hands." 301 The Sherman Act, however,
has not been struck down or even limited on nondelegation grounds. Thus,
one might argue that Erie cannot be a nondelegation case because Swift's
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act was no more expansive or
unrestrained than are the Sherman Act and the other antitrust statutes. There
are a couple of responses to this argument. First, it is not true; Swift was
much broader than the Sherman Act. But second, and more importantly, this
reasoning may get it exactly backwards. Far from proving that Erie cannot be
a nondelegation case, this analysis might show why the antitrust laws may be
constitutionally problematic, at least in some applications. 30 2
We start again on familiar grounds. The Sherman Act outlaws "[e]very
contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
301 Green, supra note 11, at 619.
302 This argument is against interest. The federal courts, by and large, have done a
"good job" with antitrust law--especially after Bork. E.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Responses, 29 CONN. L. REV. 373, 390 n.43 (1996) ("Antitrust judges have done a
remarkably good job of fashioning legal rules to protect competitive markets and restrict
anti-competitive practices. The judges do not, however, perform this work without
exercising discretion .... "); see infra note 301. But principles are not worth much if we
only follow them when they lead us to the result that we would like to reach anyway!
It also is worth noting that the Federal Trade Commission Act, which of course is a
delegation to an executive agency, is also quite broad. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006)
("The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations... from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."). The question then is
whether this too might be constitutionally problematic. It may be-though I concede that
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to strike down delegations to the Executive Branch.
As explained above, moreover, there are reasons why courts should judge delegations to
the Judiciary more harshly than delegations to an executive agency. See supra Part
III.A. 1.
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commerce." 30 3 From these few words, "the courts have created per se rules
against price-fixing, tying, horizontal boycotts, and market allocation
agreements, while the less rigid 'rule of reason' applies to covenants not to
compete, group bidding arrangements, and collective advertising
restrictions. ' '304 The statute, as interpreted, is more complicated still because
"[t]he line between [per se rules and rules of reason] is far from clear or
stable, although it ostensibly reflects the fuzzy common law that the Sherman
Act federalized. '305
Antitrust thus presents a paradox-but not necessarily the one that Judge
Bork so famously identified. 306 Under Erie, "federal courts lack the
constitutional power to promulgate substantive rules of decision in common-
law cases," but "while federal courts lack the constitutional power to alter the
common law meanings of contract and breach, they nonetheless possess the
power to define-and redefine-the terms of a '[reasonable] contract' under
the Sherman Act."'30 7 This paradox can be problematic to understanding Erie
as a nondelegation case. But as a matter of law and logic, it need not be. A
paradox can be resolved in more than one way. Instead of the Sherman Act
creating problems for this Article's analysis of Erie, the better understanding
perhaps is that because Erie is a nondelegation case, it is the Sherman Act
that arguably may pose constitutional concerns in certain applications.
There is some reason to believe that the Sherman Act may be in tension
with the nondelegation doctrine.30 8 Indeed, Andrew Oldham has gone so far
as to say "the Sherman Act invites naked judicial lawmaking," and "Article I,
303 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
304 Oldham, supra note 28, at 320 (footnotes omitted).
305 Id. (footnotes omitted).
3 0 6 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
7 (1978) (arguing that antitrust's "paradox" is that aggressive enforcement of antitrust
law may actually harm consumers).
307 Oldham, supra note 28, at 322-23 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). In
fact, the paradox runs deeper still: Many who oppose common law adjudication in the
federal courts "nonetheless turn a blind eye toward-or even celebrate-judges who
assume common lawmaking powers over American commerce via the antitrust laws." Id.
at 322 (footnotes omitted) (citing BORK, supra note 306, at 72); see also id. at 346
("[T]he Sherman Act's most ardent theorists debate the most economically efficient way
to give meaning to its vacuous language while simultaneously arguing that judges should
refuse to fill gaps that Congress has left in other statutes." (footnote omitted)).
308 See Lemos, supra note 28, at 464 ("When held up against the arguments that
have been offered in praise of delegations to agencies, however, the Sherman Act's
delegation to courts seems problematic at best."); Oldham, supra note 28, at 346 ("The
more persuasive view is that Congress cannot deputize the federal courts-and federal
judges cannot accept such congressional delegation-to make standardless policy
judgments, regardless of whether the case addresses competition law." (footnote
omitted)).
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not Article III, is the constitutionally required repository for antitrust
lawmaking power." 309 At a minimum, "[v]iewing antitrust from the
perspective of the nondelegation doctrine brings one face to face with the
central difficulty that generalist judges, proceeding on a case-by-case basis
with the assistance of lay juries, seem particularly ill-suited to developing
and applying rules to govern this increasingly technical field."'3 10 Thus, "[i]t
seems clear that if the nondelegation doctrine were enforced against
delegations to courts, the Sherman Act would be a likely candidate for
constitutional invalidation." 311
Indeed, the "meandering" development of the antitrust laws312 may be
questionable under both Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry. As to
309 Oldham, supra note 28, at 344, 351.
310 Lemos, supra note 28, at 468. It also bears noting that the more complicated
antitrust law becomes, the less competent courts are to make it:
Antitrust is a highly technical field, shot through with difficult and contested
questions of economic theory. The Court has acknowledged that "courts are of
limited utility in examining difficult economic problems." Driven in part by that
recognition, the Court initially crafted antitrust law in the form of per se rules
prohibiting or protecting certain conduct. Such rules were easy to administer, but
they suffered from the predictable problems of under- and overinclusiveness. Recent
years have seen a movement away from per se rules and toward more flexible
standards that allow judges to consider the challenged conduct in context to
determine whether it appears to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. Yet the more
nuanced and complex antitrust law becomes, the farther it drifts from the ken of the
average federal judge. For example, a frequent problem in antitrust cases is
identifying and ruling out alternative explanations for seemingly anticompetitive
conduct. That is a difficult task even for economists, but it is worse for generalist
judges, who tend to lack the expertise and fact-finding capacities of specialists.
Indeed, "there is relatively little disagreement about the basic proposition that often
our general judicial system is not competent to apply the economic theory necessary
for identifying strategic behavior as anticompetitive."
Id. at 464-65 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S.
596, 609 (1972)). Professor Lemos finds these institutional factors relevant in her
pragmatic assessment of the separation of powers. See, e.g., id. at 468 (suggesting that
antitrust should be entrusted to "a specialized agency").
311 See id. at 464.
312 Oldham, supra note 28, at 335; see also Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 n.3 (2009) (limiting the scope of Judge Hand's
Alcoa decision based on more recent "developments in economic theory and antitrust
jurisprudence"); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-
82 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911)); Oldham, supra note 28, at 336 ("[T]he federal courts have repeatedly tweaked
the Sherman Act despite Congress's silence. For example, in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, Chief Justice White held that Standard Oil had violated the
Sherman Act because it had engaged in a variety of predatory practices against
competitors. By 1945, however,... Judge Hand held that Alcoa had violated section 2 of
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Panama Refining, it is altogether unclear what "intelligible principle"
Congress intended to drive antitrust. Instead, "[t]he story of modem antitrust
law is the story of the courts' efforts to settle on an intelligible principle of
their own choosing. The fact that the courts have flip-flopped in their efforts
to find such a principle--despite the unchanged text of the statute-
highlights the fact that they are blatantly exercising lawmaking powers. '313
Though the antitrust laws are often interpreted with an eye towards
advancing consumer welfare, that intelligible principle is not announced in
the text or history of the Sherman Act, and there is reason to think that other
purposes have an equal claim to preeminence. 314 In fact,
[i]f anything can be gleaned from the text of the statute and what we know
of its genesis, it is that Congress did not purport to resolve the many
difficult puzzles of antitrust itself. Congress opted instead for "regulation by
lawsuit," leaving it to the courts to strike the appropriate balance between
competition and collusion. 315
the Sherman Act, even though it was not accused of predatory conduct. Some thirty years
later the tide once again shifted, and the law required a showing of anticompetitive
conduct as a prerequisite to a successful monopolization claim." (footnotes omitted)).
313 Oldham, supra note 28, at 351-52 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Lemos notes:
The choices left to courts, moreover, are not interstitial or technical; they are
foundational. Courts, not Congress, have given content to the core concept of
"competition"--thereby defining what the goal of antitrust law is and should be. In
the 1960s and 1970s, the Court conceived of competition in terms of small business
versus big business, and crafted antitrust rules with a view toward facilitating
competition between those groups (even if the result was higher prices and less
desirable products). Due in large part to the theoretical influence of the Chicago
School, antitrust law underwent a "counterrevolution" in the 1970s and 1980s,
resulting in a new conception of competition that focuses on "the economic coin of
low prices, high output, and maximum room for innovation."
Lemos, supra note 28, at 463 (footnotes omitted) (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 2 (2005)).
314 See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 28, at 351 n.208 (collecting authorities that say the
purpose of the antitrust laws is economic efficiency and competing authorities that say
otherwise).
315 Lemos, supra note 28, at 462-63 (quoting 9 ALEXANDER BICKEL & BENNO C.
SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY
AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910-21, at 130 (1984)).
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Thus, "[t]he result is a statute 'so open textured ... that any standard the
Court adopts is ultimately a judicial creation.' 316 This may present a
Panama Refining problem.
There may be Schechter Poultry problems too. The power to create
antitrust law is the power to regulate much of the economy. Using the
antitrust laws, a federal court arguably can make almost any major economic
transaction illegal, even those with very little probability of harming
consumers. For instance, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, a Clayton
Act 3 17 case, a merger was blocked between the third- and eighth-largest shoe
makers. 318 It is hard to see how a merger like this could have harmed
consumers. As Judge Posner has explained, Brown Shoe "seemed ... to
establish the illegality of any nontrivial acquisition of a competitor, whether
or not the acquisition was likely either to bring about or shore up collusive
or oligopoly pricing," because, "[t]he elimination of a significant rival was
thought by itself to infringe the complex of social and economic values
conceived by a majority of the Court to inform [the antitrust laws]. '319 Such
expansive authority over the American economy arguably is in real tension
with the holding in Schechter Poultry.
Because Erie, rightly understood, holds that the nondelegation doctrine
can apply when federal courts (and not just executive agencies) are
Congress's delegate, the antitrust laws may be constitutionally suspect, at
least in some applications. Consistent with the nondelegation doctrine, courts
arguably are the wrong branch of government to create "'the Magna Carta of
free enterprise' or the 'charter of economic liberty."' 320 Congress should step
in and decide what is lawful and what is not, especially for complex and
controverted economic issues such as monopolization by below-cost pricing
and the like.321 Put simply, while "[t]he line has not been exactly drawn
which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated
by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
316 Id. at 463 (alteration in original) (quoting William H. Page, Interest Groups,
Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation,
1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 659).
317 Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)).
318 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 297 (1962).
319 Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1385 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
320 Oldham, supra note 28, at 344-45 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1958)).
321 See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M (Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.), 324 F.3d 141, 144
(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (addressing below-cost pricing and bundled rebates).
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general provisions to fill up the details," 322 wholesale creation of a complex
code to govern the Nation's economic relationships arguably is more than
just detail-filling. Accordingly, building upon Erie and Sosa, the
nondelegation doctrine potentially should be applied in the antitrust context
too.
3 2 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Erie is an iconic case. It matters. No lawyer worth the title does not know
Erie's black-letter rule by heart, and it is hard for modem lawyers to imagine
diversity jurisdiction without the Erie doctrine. Indeed, as Justice Black put
it, Erie is "one of the most important cases at law in American legal
history."324 Justice Brandeis's pen changed the course of constitutional law
forever. Unfortunately, he did a poor job explaining why Swift had to go.
Erie's constitutional basis must lie in the separation of powers. But not
all separation of powers arguments are created equal. A separation of powers
argument such as "federal courts cannot make common law" is much too
categorical. Instead, the reason why Swift's interpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act was unconstitutional is that Congress cannot make such an
expansive and unchanneled delegation of authority to federal courts under
the nondelegation doctrine. Even if Congress had meant to make that
delegation in the Rules of Decision Act, the Constitution stood in the way.
Congress's power to hand off authority to another branch-be it the
Executive or Judicial-is not endless. The line is not easy to draw, but there
is one. And Swift crossed it.
Reading Erie as a nondelegation case makes sense. The grant of
authority that the Swift Court inferred from the Rules of Decision Act was
both expansive and undirected. Almost the whole of commercial law being
handed over to unelected federal judges? With no congressional guidance at
all? When one steps back and looks at what Swift actually meant, it is clear
that such a sprawling delegation of policy-making power runs headlong into
322 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825).
323 This is not to say that at this late date, all of antitrust is problematic. For
instance, the law on hardcore price-fixing is firmly settled. See, e.g., Harry First, The
Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 144 (2009) (explaining that for
"cartel enforcement ... the harm is obvious, and the cases generally do not raise (or the
defendants are not permitted to raise) efficiency claims that make possible a calculation
of the social benefits to weigh against the social harm"). There is little reason to upset
such a black-letter rule. This arguably is not necessarily true, however, for other antitrust
doctrines where policy is still being made. This Article takes no position on the question
of the constitutionality of the antitrust laws, an extraordinarily complicated question, but
merely notes that there may be a question, which itself is important.
324 Hugo L. Black, Address, 13 MO. B.J. 173, 174 (1942).
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining-two cases decided shortly before
Erie and by almost an identical Supreme Court. While most statutes
delegating authority will not raise serious nondelegation concerns, regardless
of whether they authorize agencies or courts to make law, truly extraordinary
delegations cannot be allowed to stand. Congress has broad discretion in this
field, but precedent is plain that the power to delegate is not endless.
Sosa can be classified as a nondelegation case too. A broad reading of
the Alien Tort Statute would have presented profound nondelegation
problems by putting federal courts in the improper role of making important
policy decisions without any legislative guidance. The takeaway point is
simple: If Congress wants federal courts to apply customary international
law, then Congress needs to tell the federal courts how to do that-with
specificity. Likewise, given Erie's nondelegation holding, the antitrust laws
arguably are also problematic, at least in some applications. It may be
Congress alone which should create federal law to undergird the Nation's
antitrust regime.
In the end, this Article raises one fundamental question: If Congress were
to enact a statute giving the Executive Branch authority to promulgate rules
of decision to govern diversity cases where no state statute is on point, would
not that delegation conflict with Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining?
Because the answer must be yes, Erie sits well as a nondelegation decision,
and should be placed alongside Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining in
the nondelegation canon. The nondelegation doctrine is based on the
fundamental notion that under our Constitution, Congress must make
important policy decisions and cannot deputize any other branch of
government into that role. That simple but profound truth solidifies Erie's
place in constitutional law.
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